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I. INTRODUCTION

Since the Supreme Court held that economic development satisfied the

Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment in Kelo v. City of New London
in June 2005,' it has been open season on the Court and its Justices.2 One
* Associate Professor of Law, Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky University. I would like to thank my research assistant, James Owen, for his valuable help. Any errors are
solely attributable to the author.
1. 545 U.S. 469, 484.
2. Of course, not all of the observations about Kelo have been negative. For commentary that
viewed the decision in a positive light, see, for example, Timothy Egan, Ruling Sets off Tug of War
over Private Property, N.Y. IMES, July 30, 2005, at Al, reporting that the California League of
Cities supported the decision, arguing that "[rledevelopment is sometimes the only tool a community

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 59:3:561

commentator decried the Court's ruling as "probably the most universally
despised Supreme Court decision in decades" 3 while another suggested

that "[t]wenty years from now, people will look back at Kelo the way
people look back at Roe v. Wade."' With a tad bit of hyperbole, Kelo

"threaten[ed] more homes, small businesses, and churches with destruction ...than all the nuclear-tipped missiles the Soviet Union could have
launched in a pre-emptive first strike at the height of the Cold War. "' De-

ciding that the best defense against the threat posed by Kelo is a good offense, one Californian devised a plan to seize Justice Souter's New Hampshire farm by eminent domain and erect the "Lost Liberty Hotel" on the

property.6 Naturally, the justification for the condemnation of the property
in New Hampshire was economic development. 7 Whatever the merits of
the proposal to condemn Justice Souter's farm, Kelo is, to say the least, a

controversial decision.8
If the difference in the number of amicus briefs submitted on behalf of
the parties serves as a proxy, the negative reaction to Justice Stevens's 5-4

majority opinion9 was predictable. Of the forty-one amicus briefs submitted to the Court, twenty-eight of them supported the petitioner, Susette
has to jumpstart revitalization of downtrodden, blighted communities" and also noting Oakland's
mayor comments that he "understand[s] the horror of urban renewal .... But you don't want to take
away a tool that a city has to reform itself. If you did, Oakland would suffer greatly." (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Carrie Weimar, Crimping Eminent Domain, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Nov. 13, 2006, at BI, available at 2006 WLNR 19713936 (containing comments from Florida developers regarding the reaction to the Court's decision in Kelo).
3.
William Yardley, After Eminent Domain Victory, Disputed Project Goes Nowhere, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 21, 2005, at Al (quoting Scott Bullock, who represented Susette Kelo before the Supreme Court).
4.
Gary J. Andres, The Kelo Backlash; Americans Want Limits on Eminent Domain, WASH.
TIMES, Aug. 29, 2005, at A21.
5.
Bob Marshall, It Can Happen Here: Law in Kelo Has Counterpart in Virginia Cod,
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, July 3, 2005, at E3; see also Matt Labash, Evicting David Sower,
WKLY.STANDARD, Feb. 13, 2006, at 20, available at 2006 WLNR 2688916 (including descriptions
of the holding as an "acceptable tactic to an urban planner in Leningrad, circa 1925" and the majority's conclusion "that yuppification is a valid public purpose").
6.
See Labash, supra note 5. The Californian, Logan Darrow Clements, chose Justice Souter
"[blecause his address was the easiest to find on the Internet." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Clements utilized his website to sell items "from throw pillows to camisoles." Id. Furthermore, Clements received a number of pun-filled suggestions for the hotel's menu, including "Chicken Seizure
Salad and Revenge Soup" or "the Bader-Ginz Burger with Half-Baked Potato or the Eminent Lo
Mein. Dessert might include Rocky Road to Serfdom Ice Cream.. . ." Id. The plan was not without
critics.
See,
e.g.,
Posting
of
Randy
Barnett
to
The
Volokh
Conspiracy,
http://volokh.com/archives/archive2005_0626-20050702.shtm#1119986258
(June 28, 2005,
15:17);
Posting
of
Eugene
Volokh
to
The
Volokh
Conspiracy,
http://volokh.com/archives/archive 2005 06 26-20050702.shtml#1120089545 (June 29, 2005,
19:59). As of this writing, the proposal to seize Justice Souter's farm appears to be headed nowhere
fast. A March 14, 2006 ballot initiative regarding the project was defeated by more than a two to one
margin. See Sower Won't Get Taste of His Own Medicine, MSNBC, Mar. 15, 2006,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/1 1827131/.
7.
See Labash, supra note 5.
8.
See Egan, supra note 2, at Al.
9.
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472-90 (2005).
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Kelo.'0 Attempting to mollify critics, the slim Kelo majority pointed out
that "nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power" and reminded readers that

"many States already impose 'public use' requirements that are stricter
than the federal baseline."" Slightly later in the opinion, the majority reiterated that "[tihis Court's authority . . . extends only to determining

whether the City's proposed condemnations are for a 'public use' within
the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution." 2 Jus-

tice Stevens's majority opinion sent an unambiguous message: states remained free to enact more substantial barriers to the government's ability
10.
The twenty-eight briefs in support of petitioners: Brief Amicus Curiae of the Property Rights
Foundation of America, Inc. in Support of Petitioners, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469
(2005) (No. 04-108), 2004 WL 2787137; Brief of Amici Curiae the National Ass'n of Home Builders
and the National Ass'n of Realtors(R) in Support of the Petitioners, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108),
2004 WL 2787139; Brief for Reason Foundation as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Kelo, 545
U.S. 469 (No. 04-108), 2004 WL 2787140; Brief of Amicus Curiae the Becket Fund for Religious
Liberty in Support of Petitioners, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108), 2004 WL 2787141; Brief of
Amici Curiae Better Government Ass'n et al. in Support of Petitioners, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04108), 2004 WL 2787142; Amicus Curiae Brief on the Merits of Mountain States Legal Foundation and
Defenders of Property Rights in Support of Petitioners, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108), 2004 WL
2802968; Brief of Cascade Policy Institute et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Kelo, 545
U.S. 469 (No. 04-108), 2004 WL 2802969; Brief Amici Curiae of Laura B. Kohr and Leon P. Hailer,
Esquire, Trustee, Owners of Lauxmont Farms, in Support of Petitioners, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04108), 2004 WL 2802970; Brief of Amicus Curiae The Claremont Institute Center for Constitutional
Jurisprudence in Support of Petitioners, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108), 2004 WL 2802971; Brief
of Amicus Curiae New London R.R. Co., Inc. in Support of Petitioners, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04108), 2004 WL 2802973; Amicus Curiae Brief of the Tidewater Libertarian Party on the Merits in
Support of the Appellants, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108), 2004 WL 2803190; Brief of Jane Jacobs
as Amica Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108), 2004 WL 2803191;
Brief Amicus Curiae of Professors David L. Callies et al. in Support of Petitioners, Kelo, 545 U.S.
469 (No. 04-108), 2004 WL 2803192; Brief of the Goldwater Institute et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108), 2004 WL 2803193; Brief of Amicus Curiae
King Ranch Inc. in Support of Petitioners, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108), 2004 WL 2803448;
Brief Amicus Curiae of John Norquist, President, Congress for New Urbanism in Support of Petitioners, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108), 2004 WL 2811055; Brief Amici Curiae of Mary Bugryn Dudko et al. in Support of Petitioners, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108), 2004 WL 2811056; Brief of
Amici Curiae NAACP et al. in Support of Petitioners, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108), 2004 WL
2811057; Brief Amici Curiae of Develop Don't Destroy (Brooklyn), Inc. & The West Harlem Business Group in Support of Petitioners, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108), 2004 WL 2811058; Brief of
Amici Curiae New London Landmarks, Inc. et al. in Support of Petitioners on the Merits, Kelo, 545
U.S. 469 (No. 04-108), 2004 WL 2812099; Brief of Amicus Curiae King Ranch Inc. in Support of
Petitioners, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108), 2004 WL 2825827; Brief Amici Curiae of Robert Nigel
Richards et al. Supporting Petitioners, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108), 2004 WL 2802967; Brief of
the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108), 2004
WL 2802972; Brief Amici Curiae of the American Farm Bureau Federation et al. in Support of Petitioners, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108), 2004 WL 2787138; Brief of Amici Curiae America's
Future Inc. & Somerset Transmission & Repair Center in Support of Petitioners, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469
(No. 04-108), 2004 WL 2750340; Amicus Curiae Brief of The Rutherford Institute in Support of
Petitioners, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108), 2004 WL 2605096; Brief Amicus Curiae of the Property Rights Foundation of America, Inc. in Support of Petitioners, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108),
2004 WL 1900737; Brief Amicus Curiae of James M. Buchanan et al. in Support of Petitioners, Kelo,
545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108), 2004 WL 1882158.
11.
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489.
12.
Id. at 489-90.
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to acquire land by eminent domain than offered by the Court's decision in
13
Kelo.
Following the decision, states responded to Justice Stevens's invitation
by subjecting eminent domain to a "summer of scrutiny."' 4 State legislators banded together "[i]n a rare display of unanimity" to support eminent
domain reform in a manner "that cut[] across partisan and geographic
lines." 5 More specifically, forty-four state legislatures have debated bills
that, if enacted, would fire a return salvo at the Court's holding in Kelo. 6
Twenty-eight of those legislatures had passed eminent domain legislation
that circumscribed the government's ability to exercise its sovereign power
of eminent domain.' 7 As the mass of legislation shows, eminent domain
has moved from the pages of legal reporters to the middle of the public
debate.
Though legislatures quickly responded to anti-Kelo sentiment with an
"avalanche of bills," "8post-Kelo reforms have been subjected to almost as
much criticism as the decision from which they spawned. Critics are quick
to point out that many of the post-Kelo legislative measures are riddled
with exceptions that fail to curb the risk posed by economic development
takings. '"For example, Texas legislatively banned the exercise of eminent
domain for purposes of economic development "unless the economic development is a secondary purpose resulting from municipal community
development." 20 The definition of "municipal community development" is
vague at best; therefore, a possibility exists that condemnors could use
"municipal community development" to mask economic development takings. 2' To be fair, Texas was not the only state to enact a measure containing an exception that threatened, in theory, to swallow whatever protection
was offered by the measure in the first place.22 As a result, post-Kelo reforms are susceptible to the charge they are little more than "a feint to
pretend to do something about eminent domain without actually doing anything to upset the apple cart."23
13.
See id. at 489.
14.
Egan, supra note 2, at Al.
15.
John M. Broder, States Curbing Right to Seize Private Homes, N.Y. TtMES, Feb. 21, 2006, at
Al.
16.
See National Conference of State Legislatures, Eminent Domain 2006 State Legislation,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/natres/emindomainleg06.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2008).
17.
Id.
18.
Broder, supra note 15, at A17.
19.
See infra notes 254-261 and accompanying text.
20.
10 TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2206.001(b)(3) (Vernon Supp. 2007). This section also provides an exception for "municipal urban renewal activities to eliminate an existing affirmative harm on
society from slum or blighted areas." Id.
21.
See id. The code section does not provide a definition of "municipal community development." Id.
22.
See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1040 (Supp. 2007).
23.
Dan Walters, Eminent Domain Bills are Stalled - Except One for Casino Tribe,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 16, 2005, at A3, available at 2005 WLNR 14647451.
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This Article revisits the Court's controversial decision in Kelo, explores the legislative responses to its holding, and defends both Kelo and
its legislative progeny against the criticisms directed at them. Part II of
this paper sketches the jurisprudential evolution of the Public Use Clause,
including a description of the majority and two dissenting opinions in Kelo. Part III argues that the Kelo majority's interpretation of the Public Use
Clause and its deference to legislative determinations are justified by
precedent and the political philosophies that animate the Takings Clause.
The legislation produced during eminent domain's "summer of scrutiny"
is detailed in Part IV along with the criticism of those legislative efforts.
Furthermore, Part IV suggests that post-Kelo legislation is not as heavyhanded as one might expect in light of the public outcry against the decision and employs public choice theory to explain the disjuncture. Part V
argues that, despite its perceived limitations, post-Kelo legislation
represents a pragmatic approach to a specific land use issue that promotes
community self-determination. The paper concludes that post-Kelo legislation symbolizes the government's effort to remedy the breach of the public's trust caused by Kelo regardless of one's substantive view of those
legislative measures. Furthermore, the robust post-Kelo legislative response is a testament to the strength of one of the core principles of our
government-federalism.
II. KELO, PUBLIC USE, AND LEGISLATIVE DEFERENCE
The maxim that "[t]he Constitution creates a Federal Government of
enumerated powers" represents one of the "first principles" associated
with the structure of our government.24 For those interested in constitutional law, the powers in Article 1, § 8 are familiar-the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes," the power "[t]o make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers,"
and so on.25 However, searching for the power of eminent domain in the
text of the Constitution is an exercise in futility-it does not appear in the
Constitution.2 6 Instead, eminent domain is an inherent attribute of sovereignty that permits the sovereign to acquire an individual's property for
purposes determined by the sovereign without the individual's consent.27
24.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).
25.
U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8.
26.
See Philip Nichols, Jr., The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20 B.U.
L. REv. 615, 616 (1940).
27.
See United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 241 (1946) (referring to the Takings Clause as
.a tacit recognition of a preexisting power"); Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1875)
("The proper view of the right of eminent domain seems to be, that it is a right belonging to a sovereignty to take private property for its own public uses, and not for those of another. Beyond that,
there exists no necessity; which alone is the foundation of the right. If the United States have the
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Indeed, "'[iln every government there is inherent authority to appropriate
the property of the citizen for the necessities of the State ....,21 Without
such inherent authority, the "independent existence and perpetuity" of the
sovereign would be threatened.2 9
But simply because eminent domain is an inherent power of the sovereign does not mean that the sovereign can exercise its power without restriction.3" To the contrary, the concluding phrase of the Constitution's
Fifth Amendment establishes two limitations on the sovereign's ability to
acquire property by eminent domain-"nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation."3 Denominated as the Takings
Clause, those words serve, at least in theory, as an obstacle to the unfettered exercise of "[t]he despotic power. " 12 The first part of the Takings

Clause, the Public Use Clause, bars the government from seizing an individual's property unless the property is put to a public post-condemnation
use.33 The second part, the Just Compensation Clause, requires the gov-

ernment to pay for the property it acquires from private owners, which is
typically defined as the fair market value of the acquired property." Most
eminent domain cases involve the public use requirement because, if the
taking is successfully challenged, the property owner retains title to her

property. In contrast, a successful just compensation challenge obtains
power, it must be complete in itself. It can neither be enlarged nor diminished by a State. Nor can any
State prescribe the manner in which it must be exercised. The consent of a State can never be a condition precedent to its enjoyment. Such consent is needed only, if at all, for the transfer of jurisdiction
and of the right of exclusive legislation after the land shall have been acquired.").
28.
Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 240 (1897) (quoting
COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE
POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 357 (photo. reprint, De Capo Press 1972) [hereinafter COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS] (defining eminent domain).
29.
See Kohl, 91 U.S. at 371.
30.
See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R., 166 U.S. at 240 ( "'[C]onstitutional provisions do not
confer the power, though they generally surround it with safeguards to prevent abuse.'" (quoting
COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 28, at 357)).
31.
U.S. CONST. amend. V. In its entirety, the Fifth Amendment states that
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.
Id.
32.
Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 311 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795); see also Sheldon Richman, Will Bush Side with the Property Thieves?, BALT. CHRON., Jan. 21, 2005,
http://www.baltimorechronicle.com/012105SheldonRichman.html.
33.
For more on the public use requirement, see infra Subpart I.A.
34.
See, e.g., United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, More or Less, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979)
("The Court therefore has employed the concept of fair market value to determine the [amount of the]
condemnee's loss."). For more on the fair market value standard, see LEWIS ORGEL, VALUATION
UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 20 (James C. Bonbright ed., 2d ed. 1953), which discusses
the various definitions of fair market value used by courts around the nation.
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more money for the individual, but title to the property is lost. As a result,
the two most common issues in most eminent domain cases address the
definitional scope of "public use" for constitutional purposes and the role
of courts in the determination of what is and what is not a public use.
A. The Interpretive Evolution of "Public Use"
Interpreting the Fifth Amendment's Public Use Clause has proven nettlesome for courts and commentators throughout the history of eminent
domain jurisprudence. During the early nineteenth century, many courts
embraced a broad-a very broad-view of the scope of public uses that
satisfied state constitutional requirements." Public use equated to public
benefit and the "public" nature of the benefit was often imperceptible
without performing intellectual contortions.36 The Supreme Court of Georgia, for example, deemed an 1834 statute that permitted the condemnation
of private rights of way to be unconstitutional in Brewer v. Bowman,37 but
only because the Act did not "provide'] any just compensation. , 38 Even
though the public would not have access to the passageway, the ability of
the private individual to get goods to and from the marketplace endowed
the condemnations with a public benefit.39 In Scudder v. Trenton Delaware
Falls Co. ," a private landowner complained that the condemnation of his
land for the purpose of conducting water to a privately owned mill did not
constitute a public use. 4' Comparing the potential effect of the mill at issue
to the effect of an existing mill in a different county, the court found that
the other private mill had "increased the value of property in all that district of country; opened a market for the produce of the soil, and given a
stimulus to industry of every kind." 42 Because a mill in a neighboring
county bestowed benefits upon that local community, the mill at issue constituted a valid public use.43 So long as the condemnation had some faintly
colorable public benefit, courts with a broad interpretation of public use
would uphold condemnations against public use attacks."
The seemingly boundless interpretation of "public use" during the early nineteenth century met opposition from legal commentators and judges
35.
36.

See Nichols, supra note 26, at 617.
See id. at 617-18.

37.

9 Ga. 37, 39 (Ga. 1850).

38.
See id. at 39-42.
39.
Id. at 40 (also noting that "the public interest would also be promoted, by enabling every
citizen to perform all the duties which are required of him by law, for the benefit of the whole community").
40.
1 N.J. Eq. 694 (N.J. Ch. 1832).
41.
See id. at 696, 698, 728.
42.
Id. at 729. The court also observed that the mills to be served by the water "will be sufficient
for the erection of seventy mills, and factories, and other works dependent on such power." Id. at 728.
43.
See id. at 727-30.
44.
See Nichols, supra note 26, at 617.
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later in that century.45 In his influential treatise on constitutional law,
Thomas M. Cooley argued that "public use implies a possession, occupation, and enjoyment of the land by the public, or public agencies. " '
Echoing Cooley's argument in Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson R.R.
Co.,47 Senator Tracy disparaged the substitution of "public utility, public
interest, common benefit, general advantage or convenience, or that still
more indefinite term public improvement" for "public use," which had a
natural connotation of "public possession and occupation." 4 8 In his dissent
to the majority decision in West River Bridge Co. v. Dix,4 9 Justice Woodbury similarly complained that "[i]t may be, and truly is, that individuals
and the public are often extensively benefited by private roads, as they are
by mills, and manufactories, and private bridges. But such a benefit is not
technically nor substantially a public use, unless the public has rights." 5 °
According to Justice Woodbury's interpretation of public use, uses "must
in their essence, and character,
and liabilities, be public within the mean51
ing of the term 'public use."'
From the critics' point of view, the expansive nature of what counted
as a "public use" posed a substantial threat to the right of private property.
In his Bloodgood opinion, Senator Tracy questioned what limit could be
placed upon the legislature to protect private property if the broad interpretation was the correct constitutional interpretation.52 The implication
was that no such limit could be imagined. And although it recognized that
"[p]ublic use may . . . mean public usefulness, utility or advantage, or
45.

See id. (identifying the time of the transition as the 1840s or 1850s).
COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 28, at 531 (1868), quoted in James W.
Ely, Jr., Thomas Cooley, "Public Use," and New Directions In Takings Jurisprudence, 2004 MICH.
ST. L. REv. 845, 847.
47.
18 Wend. 9 (N.Y. 1837)
48.
Id. at 60. The case was an action for trespass against a railroad that had damaged plaintiff's
property by destroying fences and digging into the soil. See id. at 10. The railroad argued that it was
not liable for the damage because an act of incorporation gave it the right to enter plaintiff's lands. See
id. The issue revolved around whether or not the legislature's delegation of its eminent domain power
in the act of incorporation was constitutional. Id. at 29. The court held that the act was constitutional
but that the railroad had to pay damages to the plaintiff prior to the appropriation. Id. at 78. As a
result, Senator Tracy's discussion of the meaning of public use is dicta.
49.
47 U.S. 507 (1848).
50.
Id. at 547 (Woodbury, J., dissenting).
51.
Id. at 546. For a list of cases addressing the narrower interpretation of public use, see JOHN
LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES § 164, at 222 n.6
(1888), and Nichols, supra note 26, at 617 n.14, which lists cases where the court defined public use
to be "use by the public."
52.
Bloodgood, 18 Wend. at 60 (asking "is there any limitation which can be set to the exertion of
legislative will in the appropriation of private property?"). Later, Senator Tracy remarked that
[i]t seems to me that such a construction of legislative powers is inconsistent with the secure
possession and enjoyment of private property, and repugnant to the language and object of
the constitutional provision. Indeed, it concedes to legislative discretion a wider range than
I think could be maintained for it on the principles of natural law, if we had no written
Constitution.
Id. at 62.
46.
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what is productive of general benefit," the Supreme Court of West Virginia lamented the consequences of such a definition in Salt Co. v. Brown.53
The court feared that "the great constitutional safeguard" protecting the
right of private property "will be utterly subverted" without a narrowing
of the interpretation of public use. 54 In other words, the broad interpretation of public use not only risked merely encroaching upon, but swallowing the right to private property in its entirety.
In reality, neither the narrow nor the broad interpretation covered the
field of public use interpretation.55 Instead, the two competing views managed to coexist, but the result in any given case was, to say the least,
unpredictable. During the nineteenth century, for example, a railroad satisfied the public use requirement under Alabama law56 while failing to do
so under the law of West Virginia.57 Recognizing the incoherence, nineteenth century treatise writer John Lewis observed that "[w]hen, however,
we come to seek for the principles upon which the question of public use
is to be determined, or to define the words, 'public use,' in the light of
judicial decisions, we find ourselves utterly at sea." 58 Similarly, the 1876
Nevada Supreme Court wrote that "[n]o question has ever been submitted
to the courts upon which there is a greater variety and conflict of reasoning and results than that presented as to the meaning of the words 'public

53.
See Salt Co. v. Brown, 7 W. Va. 191, 196 (1874).
54.
Id.
55.
Lawrence Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REV. 203, 209
(1978) (stating that "[w]hile the narrow view of public use held considerable sway, especially in the
latter half of the nineteenth century, it never completely took over the field").
56.
Aldridge v. Tuscumbia, Courtland, & Decatur R.R., 2 Stew. & P. 199, 199 (Ala. 1832)
(upholding the exercise of eminent domain for railroad purposes). The court stated that
[i]t
is true, that the term "use," is employed in the latter clause of the thirteenth section of
our declaration of rights. "Nor shall any person's property be taken, or applied to public
use, unless just compensation be made therefor." But, it would be curtailing the sovereign
power of the government, very much, indeed, to say, that, under this clause, in the declaration of rights, private property could not be appropriated to the public, without a continued
occupancy of the thing appropriated. Whatever is beneficially employed for the community,
is of public use, and a distinction cannot be tolerated.
Id. at 203.
57.
Pittsburg, W. & K. R. Co. v. Benwood Iron-Works, 31 W. Va. 710, 735 (1888) (reversing a
lower court decision to allow a railroad company to condemn land pursuant to a state statute). The
court ruled that
[t]he mere declaration in a petition, that the property is to be appropriated to public use
does not make it so; and evidence, that the public will have a right to use it, amounts to
nothing in the face of the fact, that the only incentive to ask for the condemnation was a
private gain, and it was apparent, that the general public had no interest in it.
We would do nothing to hinder the development of the State nor to cripple railroad companies in assisting such development, but at the same time we must protect the property-rights
of the citizens. Whatever corporations may be entitled under a proper construction of the
law they will receive; but they must not be permitted to take private property for private
use.
Id. at 735.
58.
LEWIS, supra note 51, § 159, at 217.
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use.'"9 With a hint of sarcasm, the court opined that "[t]he authorities are
so diverse and conflicting, that no matter which road the court may take it
will be sustained, and opposed, by about an equal number of the decided

cases. "60
The confusion that enveloped the constitutional interpretation of public
use during the nineteenth century predictably made its way into twentieth
century public use jurisprudence. In Berman v. Parker,6' the Court evaluated the constitutionality of the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act

of 1945 (DCRA),62 an effort to eradicate the problems of blight and substandard housing in a District of Columbia neighborhood.6 3 To promote
redevelopment, the condemned lands were to be transferred to parties who

agreed to initiate projects that conformed to the overall plan. 6' Although
public agencies could receive land under the DCRA, section 7(g) of the
statute stated that private parties were the preferred recipients of the properties acquired pursuant to eminent domain.65 Because his land was to be

transferred to a private party following condemnation under the DCRA, a
commercial property owner challenged it as a violation of the public use
limitation of the Fifth Amendment. 66
Midway into its unanimous decision, the Court identified a justification that satisfied the public use requirement that connoted a broad inter-

59.
Dayton Gold & Silver Mining Co. v. Seawell, 11 Nev. 394, 400-01 (1876).
60.
Id. at 401. The full text of the court's comment, which reflects the judicial dissatisfaction with
the state of the law, is as follows:
[w]hat is the meaning of the words "public use" as contained in the provision of our state
constitution?" It is contended by respondent that these words should be construed with the
utmost rigor against those who try to seize property, and in favor of those whose property
is to be seized. In other words, that in favor of private rights the construction should be
strict; that the words mean possession, occupation, or direct enjoyment by the public. On
the other hand, it is claimed by petitioner that courts should give to the words a broader and
more extended meaning, viz., that of utility, advantage or benefit; that any appropriation of
private property under the right of eminent domain for any purpose of great public benefit,
interest or advantage to the community is a taking for a public use. No question has ever
been submitted to the courts upon which there is a greater variety and conflict of reasoning
and results than that presented as to the meaning of the words "public use" as found in the
different state constitutions regulating the right of eminent domain. The reasoning is in
many of the cases as unsatisfactory as the results have been uncertain. The beaten path of
precedent to which courts, when in doubt, seek refuge, here furnishes no safe guide to lead
us through the long lane of uncertainty to the open highway of public justice and of right.
Id. at 400-01; see also Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158 (1896) (observing
that "[t]he question, what constitutes a pubic use, has been before the courts of many of the States and
their decisions have not been harmonious).
61.
348 U.S. 26 (1954).
62.
District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, ch. 736, 60 Stat. 790 (1946).
63.
Breman, 348 U.S. at 28-31. Section five of the DCRA delegated the power of eminent domain to a governmental agency for "'the redevelopment of blighted territory in the District of Columbia and the prevention, reduction, or elimination of blighting factors or causes of blight.'" Id. at 29.
64.
Id. at 30.
65.
Id.
66.
Id. at 30-31. A department store resided on the property. Id.
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pretation of public use-a generalized, nondescript "public welfare." 67 The
Court declared that "[t]he concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as
well as monetary."68 In this case, the DCRA promoted the "public welfare" by resuscitating a neighborhood through the elimination of blight and
inadequate housing on an area-wide basis.69 According to the Court, the
plan promoted the public welfare because
[m]iserable and disreputable housing conditions may do more than
spread disease and crime and immorality. They may also suffocate
the spirit by reducing the people who live there to the status of cattle. They may indeed make living an almost insufferable burden.
They may also be an ugly sore, a blight on the community which
robs it of charm, which makes it a place from which men turn.
The misery of housing may despoil a community as an open sewer
may ruin a river.7"
Given that description of the living conditions in the area slated for acquisition, the Court held that the DCRA did not violate the public use clause
of the Fifth Amendment. 7'
After a period of thirty years, the Supreme Court returned to .public
use doctrine in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff. 2 In Midkiff, Hawaii
determined that its "feudal land tenure system" had distorted the market
for residential property thereby "injuring the public tranquility and welfare. "" To energize its sagging residential real property market, the legis67.
68.
69.

Id.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 33.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 34-35. The Court reported that
[t]he experts concluded that if the community were to be healthy, if it were not to revert
again to a blighted or slum area, as though possessed of a congenital disease, the area must
be planned as a whole. It was not enough, they believed, to remove existing buildings that
were insanitary or unsightly. It was important to redesign the whole area so as to eliminate
the conditions that cause slums-the overcrowding of dwellings, the lack of parks, the lack
of adequate streets and alleys, the absence of recreational areas, the lack of light and air,
the presence of outmoded street patterns. It was believed that the piecemeal approach, the
removal of individual structures that were offensive, would be only a palliative. The entire
area needed redesigning so that a balanced, integrated plan could be developed for the region, including not only new homes but also schools, churches, parks, streets, and shopping centers. In this way it was hoped that the cycle of decay of the area could be controlled and the birth of future slums prevented.
Id. at 32-33.
See id. at 35-36.
467 U.S. 229 (1984).
Id. at 232. The Court described the feudal system in Hawaii as one
in which one island high chief, the ali'i nui, controlled the land and assigned it for development to certain subchiefs. The subchiefs would then reassign the land to other lower
ranking chiefs, who would administer the land and govern the farmers and other tenants
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lature enacted the Land Reform Act of 1967 (LRA), which allowed the
government to acquire fee simple titles by eminent domain and subsequently transfer them to qualified private parties.74 Ten years after the
enactment of the LRA, a private landowner, whose property was subject
to an action for eminent domain, filed suit, claiming that the LRA violated
the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment.75
The Court's Midkiff decision reaffirmed the broad understanding of
"public use" delineated in Berman,7 6 which may have been predictable
given the similarity of the issues in the two cases. 77 The Court stated that
post-condemnation conveyances to private parties did not necessarily lead
to the conclusion that the sovereign's exercise of its eminent domain power was unconstitutional. 7' To the contrary, "[tihe Court long ago rejected
any literal requirement that condemned property be put into use for the
general public. , 79 In fact, the beneficiaries of an eminent domain action

need not constitute "any considerable portion" of the community."0 Instead, the transaction as a whole may rise to a "public affair" because of
"its class or character."" In this case, the problems associated with Hawaii's "unique" land oligopoly and the scheme adopted to combat those

working it. All land was held at the will of the ali'i nui and eventually had to be returned to
his trust. There was no private ownership of land.
Id. This resulted in a real estate market where
State and Federal Governments owned almost 49% of the State's land, another 47% was in
the hands of only 72 private landowners. The legislature further found that 18 landholders,
with tracts of 21,000 acres or more, owned more than 40% of this land and that on Oahu,
the most urbanized of the islands, 22 landowners owned 72.5% of the fee simple titles.
Id. (citation omitted).
74.
Id. at 233-34. According to the terms of the Act,
tenants living on single-family residential lots within developmental tracts at least five acres
in size are entitled to ask the Hawaii Housing Authority (HHA) to condemn the property on
which they live. When 25 eligible tenants, or tenants on half the lots in the tract, whichever
is less, file appropriate applications, the Act authorizes HHA to hold a public hearing to determine whether acquisition by the State of all or part of the tract will "effectuate the public
purposes" of the Act.
Id. at 233 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
75.
See id. at 233-35.
76.
Id. at 239-41.
77.
Compare id. at 231-32 (addressing issue of Hawaii taking fee simple titles using eminent
domain and moving them to qualified private parties), with Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 28-31
(1954) (addressing issue of District of Columbia using eminent domain to condemn and take property
designated as a blighted area of the city).
78.
See Midaiff, 467 U.S. at 244.
79.
Id.
80.
Id. (quoting Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923)).
81.
Id. (quoting Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135, 155 (1921)). The quoted language goes back even
further than the Court's citation. In Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, the Court examined
whether or not the condemnation of land for an irrigation system constituted a public use for Fifth
Amendment purposes. 164 U.S. 112, 158-59 (1896). The Court stated that "[i]t is not essential that
the entire community or even any considerable portion thereof should directly enjoy or participate in
an improvement in order to constitute a public use." Id. at 161-62.
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problems endowed the LRA with a public use that met the demands of the
Fifth Amendment.'
The most recent addition to the jungle of public use jurisprudence arrived with June 2005's Kelo v. City of New London. 3 During the mid1990s, the city of New London was in the midst of an economic downturn
and its economic forecast looked bleak.' The city's unemployment rate
had reached crisis levels and the population base had eroded to its lowest
point since the 1920s."5 In light of the economic problems facing the city,
a Connecticut state agency identified New London as a "distressed municipality" and decided to use its power of eminent domain to acquire property for redevelopment purposes .16 Following acquisition, the condemning
authority was to transfer the property to Pfizer, Inc. so that it would be "a
catalyst to the area's rejuvenation."'7 The property targeted for acquisition
consisted of 115 privately owned, non-blighted parcels of land in the New
London neighborhood of Fort Trumbull."8 Susette Kelo, along with several
other Fort Trumbull homeowners, challenged the exercise of eminent domain as a violation of the Fifth Amendment's public use requirement because their properties "happen[ed] to be located in the development
area."9 Eventually, the case made its way to the Supreme Court, and the
Court had to decide "whether a city's decision to take property for the
purpose of economic development satisfies the 'public use' requirement of
the Fifth Amendment."'
At the outset of its opinion, the Court observed that nineteenth century
courts utilized a narrow interpretation of public use, one that required that
the public use the property in a literal sense-the public had to leave its
footprint on the acquired property." However, the Court concluded that
the narrow interpretation had fallen out of favor over the course of time
because of the difficulty of its application and the changing needs of socie-

82.
See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245.
83.
545 U.S. 469 (2005).
84.
See id. at 473.
85.
See id. The population at the time of the eminent domain action was less than 24,000 residents. Id.
86.
Id. at 473-75. The city reactivated the New London Development Corporation to oversee the
development and delegated its power of eminent domain to that body. See id.
87.
Id. at 473. The cost of the research facility was $300 million. Id. The development was also
slated to include a hotel with restaurants and shopping, marinas, "[a] pedestrian 'riverwalk,'" "approximately 80 new residences," a new U.S. Coast Guard Museum, and other office and retail venues.
Id. at 474.
88.
Id. at 474-75. Thirty-two acres of the land to be acquired had been the site of the Naval
Undersea Warfare Center. See id. at 473-74.
89.
Id. at 475.
90.
Id. at 477. The complainants won an injunction at trial, except with respect to one parcel
designated for office use. Id. at 475-76. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Connecticut removed the
injunctions granted at trial. Id. at 476. Thereafter, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. at 477.
91.
See id. at 479.
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ty. 9 Based upon its review of the historical record, the Court discovered
that it had begun to apply a "more natural interpretation of public use as
'public purpose'" in lieu of the narrow interpretation by the end of the
nineteenth century. 93 Moreover, the Court stated that it had "repeatedly
and consistently rejected that narrow test ever since."' Turning to the
facts of the case, the Court found that the City had a "carefully formulated" plan designed to stimulate economic development in New London. 95
The development plan not only sought to create jobs and increase the tax
base of the community, but also provided for residential and recreational

uses of the condemned lands. 96 Applying its "more natural" interpretation
of public use, the Court held that New London's "plan unquestionably
serves a public purpose"; therefore,
the city's plan satisfied the Fifth
97
Amendment's Public Use Clause.
In a vigorous dissent, Justice O'Connor charged that the majority de-

cision "delete[d] the words 'for public use' from the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment." 9 8 Instead of being faithful to Court precedent, Justice

O'Connor alleged that the majority had veered from the reasoning in Berman and Midkiff by upholding an exercise of eminent domain with only
remote public benefits." The Court's decision "significantly expand[ed]
the meaning of public use" by permitting the government to take private
property from one private party and transfer it to another private party so
long as the latter's use was an "upgrade" with some "secondary" public
benefit."0 Such reasoning subjected all private property owners to the risk
of losing property for the benefit of other parties who planned to make a

92.
See id. (commenting that the narrow interpretation required answers to questions such as
"what proportion of the public need have access to the property? at what price?").
93.
Id. at 480 (citing Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158-64 (1896)).
94.
Id.
95.
See id. at 483. The Court also noted that "[t]hose who govern the City were not confronted
with the need to remove blight in the Fort Trumbull area." Id. Furthermore, the Court stated that "[t]o
effectuate this plan, the City has invoked a state statute that specifically authorizes the use of eminent
domain to promote economic development." Id. at 483-84.
96.
See id. at 474-75.
97.
Id. at 484. Justice Kennedy joined Justice Stevens's majority opinion and wrote a concurring
opinion as well. Id. at 490-93 (Kennedy, J., concurring). In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy
pointed out that subjecting public use questions to rational basis scrutiny did not mean that takings for
purely private persons would be upheld as a result of Kelo. See id. at 490. For Justice Kennedy, the
petitioners' per se test of invalidity was unnecessary because of the adequacy of the present degree of
scrutiny and would sacrifice a number of permissible projects with unquestionable public benefits. See
id. at 492. In fact, Justice Kennedy opined that "[tihere may be private transfers in which the risk of
undetected impermissible favoritism of private parties is so acute that a presumption (rebuttable or
otherwise) of invalidity is warranted under the Public Use Clause." Id. at 493. The facts in Kelo,
however, did not warrant such invalidity because the transfers were not suspicious and the procedures
were not abused. See id.
98.
Id. at 494 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
99.
See id. at 498-501.
100.
Id. at 501,503.
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more economically attractive use of the land.'°' Penning the most memorable line from the decision, Justice O'Connor quipped that "[t]he specter
of condemnation hangs over all property. Nothing is to prevent the State
from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a factory."° 2
Although Justice Thomas joined Justice O'Connor's dissent,0 3 he also
wrote separately to assert that the majority's interpretation of public use
failed to give "the slightest nod to" the historical framework within which
the Public Use Clause was created.' According to Justice Thomas, the
"natural reading" of the Public Use Clause was to understand it as permitting "the government to take property only if the government owns, or the
public has a legal right to use, the property, as opposed to taking it for any
public purpose or necessity whatsoever."' 0 5 For evidence of this "natural
reading," Justice Thomas referred to founding era dictionaries that narrowly defined "use" to mean "[t]he act of employing any thing to any
purpose."' 06 As a result, post-condemnation transfers to private parties
violated the public use restraint on eminent domain as understood at the
time of its enactment because the public would not actually use the property. 0 7 Furthermore, Justice Thomas maintained that broadly interpreting
"public use" as "public purpose" makes the inquiry under the Necessary
and Proper Clause redundant, 0 8 "a taking is permissible under the Necessary and Proper Clause only if it serves a valid public purpose. "'09 Therefore, interpreting the "public use" restraint in the same manner reduced it
to mere "surplusage."" ° Rather than consign the Public Use Clause to
irrelevance, Justice Thomas urged a narrower conception of public use:
actual use by the public or post-condemnation governmental ownership."'
B. JudicialDeference to Legislative Determinationsof Public Use
In contrast to the legal quandary that has engulfed the proper interpretation of the Public Use Clause, courts have long held that it is their responsibility, and not that of legislatures, to determine what does and does
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

See id. at 503.
Id.
Id. at 494.
Id. at 506 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 508.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTONARY OF THE ENGLISH

LANGUAGE 2194 (4th ed. 1773)).
107.
Id.

108.
Id.at 511.
109. Id.
110.
d. Justice Thomas argued that "[t]he Clause is . . . most naturally read to concern whether
the property is used by the public or the government, not whether the purpose of the taking is legitimately public." Id.
111.
Id. at 521.

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 59:3:561

not constitute a valid public use for constitutional purposes. In the 1908
case of Hairston v. Danville & Western Railway Co.,12 the Supreme
Court observed that "[tihe one and only principle in which all courts seem
to agree is that the nature of the uses, whether public or private, is ultimately a judicial question. " 13 Despite the apparent clarity of the judicial
function in cases like Hairston, language from later cases seemed to diminish the Court's role as the final arbiter of what constitutes a public use. In
Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 11 4 the Court stated that a legislative conclusion regarding public use "is entitled to deference until it is
shown to involve an impossibility. "15 Needless to say, requiring a property owner who challenges an eminent domain proposal on public use
grounds to show that the proposal involves an "impossibility" is likely to
be an insurmountable hurdle.
If the language of cases like Old Dominion signaled a diminution of
the Court's role as the final authority on the public use question, then the
language employed in the major twentieth century public use cases did
little to prevent further erosion of that role. In Berman v. Parker,'16 the
Court asserted that the legislature served as the "main guardian of the public needs to be served by social legislation" like the exercise of eminent
domain." 7 Given its primacy in the public use determination, "when the
legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms wellnigh conclusive" for purposes of eminent domain. 8 Moreover, the Court
refused to sit as a super-legislature and re-evaluate the details of proposals
that involve eminent domain. 9 In short, the Court's role in the determination of what does and does not constitute "a public purpose is an extremely narrow one."' 20
Thirty years later, the Court reaffirmed its myopic role in reviewing
public use determinations in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff.'
Upholding Hawaii's plan to redistribute fee simple titles to correct distortions in its "feudal land tenure system," 2 the Court asserted that its past
decisions "made clear that it will not substitute its judgment for a legislature's judgment . . . 'unless the use be palpably without reasonable foun112.
208 U.S. 598 (1908).
113.
Id. at 606; see also LEWiS, supra note 51, § 158, at 216.
114.
269 U.S. 55 (1925).
115.
Id. at 66.
116.
348 U.S. 26 (1954).
117.
See id. at 32.
118.
Id. The Court also noted that "It]his principle admits of no exception merely because the
power of eminent domain is involved." Id.
119.
See id. at 32, 35-36. The Court stated that " [o]nce the question of the public purpose has been
decided, the amount and character of land to be taken for the project and the need for a particular tract
to complete the integrated plan rests in the discretion of the legislative branch." Id. at 35-36.
120.
Id. at 32.
121.
467 U.S. 229, 231-32 (1984).
122.
Id.
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Putting a finer point on the scrutiny to be applied to eminent

domain justifications, the Court concluded that that "where the exercise of
the eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable public
purpose, the Court has never held a compensated taking to be proscribed
by the Public Use Clause.""2 Given the language of Berman and Midkiff,
one might guess that the proposals failing such a deferential standard are
likely to be products of shockingly gross oversight or concocted by Justice
Scalia's proverbial "stupid staff. "125

With the deferential standard established in Berman and Midkiff as
precedent for Kelo, Justice Stevens's majority opinion noted that those
decisions embraced a broad definition of the phrase "public use" arising

from the "longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments in this
field."26 Because the needs of the public involved questions beyond the
capacity of courts to answer, the Court afforded "legislatures broad lati-

tude in determining what public needs justify the use of the takings power. "127 Although the petitioners argued in favor of a test that would exclude economic development from permissible public uses, the Court
found that economic development was an "accepted function of government" and refused to interfere with that determination.12 8 The Court was
not about "to second-guess [the wisdom of] the City's considered judgments about the efficacy of its development plan. "129 In this case, secondguessing proved to be unnecessary because the Court found that the city
"carefully formulated an economic development plan that it believes will
provide appreciable benefits to the community."130
Despite her disagreement with the majority's interpretation of public
use, Justice O'Connor broadly agreed that local determinations regarding
public use should be afforded deference by the Court. 3 ' Indeed, Justice
O'Connor acknowledged that the Court's language in Berman and Midkiff
123.
Id. at 241 (quoting United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896)).
124.
Id.
125.
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1026 n. 12 (1992).
126.
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005).
127.
See id. at 482-83.
128.
See id. at 484-85. The petitioners asked the Court to adopt a bright line test that would exclude economic development per se. Id. at 484. In the alternative, the petitioners requested that the
Court utilize a test that required the proposed plan to yield the public benefits with a "reasonable
certainty." Id. at 487. The Court dismissed that assertion based upon its narrow oversight role, which
did not include an investigation into the "wisdom" of the legislative determination. See id. at 487-88.
129.
Id. at 488. The Court added that "we also decline to second-guess the City's determinations as
to what lands it needs to acquire in order to effectuate the project." Id. at 488-89.
130.
Id. at 483 (such as "new jobs and increased tax revenue"). Justice Kennedy wrote a separate
concurrence to point out that subjecting public use questions to rational basis scrutiny did not mean
that takings for purely private persons would be upheld as a result of Kelo. See id. at 490 (Kennedy,
J., concurring). For Justice Kennedy, the petitioners' per se test of invalidity was unnecessary because
of the adequacy of the present degree of scrutiny and would sacrifice a number of permissible projects
with unquestionable public benefits. See id. at 492.
131.
See id. at 497, 499 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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emphasized that it would defer to legislative determinations of public use
because it was "ill equipped to evaluate the efficacy of proposed legislative
initiatives. "132 But whatever common ground she shared with the majority
on the question of deference, the Court retained a "narrow role" in the
public use determination; it had not abandoned its oversight function in its
entirety.' 3 3 The Court's failure to perform its admittedly "narrow" function threatened to transform the Public Use Clause into "little more than
hortatory fluff."" 3 In this case, deferring to New London's exercise of
eminent domain amounted to an "abdication of [the Court's] responsibility."35 According to Justice O'Connor, the states play vital roles in our
government "but compensating for our refusal to enforce properly the
Federal Constitution (and a provision meant to curtail state action, no less)
is not among them."136
With similar vehemence, Justice Thomas pointedly asserted that
"[t]here is no justification, however, for affording almost insurmountable
137
deference to legislative conclusions that a use serves a 'public use.''
The probability that the Framers would have singled out the Public Use
Clause for deference when legislative determinations associated with other
protections secured by the Bill of Rights do not receive such deference is
low. 3' For Justice Thomas, the deference offered to public use determinations was incompatible with the protection afforded to the home throughout the history of the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.' 39 Justice
Thomas noted that the Court inspects the reasons that justify state action in
Fourth Amendment search and seizures cases much more closely than the
public use justifications for eminent domain."4 Ironically, then, homeowners are safe from invasive searches of their homes, but the government
may take those homes by eminent domain if it needs them to satisfy what
it considers to be a "public use."' 4

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 498-99.
See id. at 500.
Id. at 497.
See id. at 504.
Id.
Id. at 517 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
See id. at 517-18.
See id. at 518.
See id. Justice Thomas asserted that
[wie would not defer to a legislature's determination of the various circumstances that establish, for example, when a search of a home would be reasonable, or when a convicted
double-murderer may be shackled during a sentencing proceeding without on-the-record
findings, or when state law creates a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause.

Id. (citations omitted).
141.

See id.
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III. A SECOND LOOK AT KELO
A comment appearing in the 1949 Yale Law Journal presciently offered "an advance requiem" for the public use limitation on eminent domain: "so far as the federal courts are concerned neither state legislatures
nor Congress need be concerned about the public use test in any of its
ramifications. " 42 Fifty-six years later, many legal commentators found the
requiem more than applicable to the post-Kelo universe of eminent domain
jurisprudence. Because of its perceived advantage to political insiders,
Kelo "puts the lie to [the] canard" that "judicial solicitude for economic
rights [is] favoritism to the wealthy and business interests. " 141 Moreover,
the majority's approach equated to "dead constitutionalism" because of the
absence of meaningful public use analysis and the matador-like deferential
standard applied to the case. 4 In short, many legal onlookers reached the
conclusion that the public use and judicial deference portions of the major45
ity opinion were wrongly decided.1
A. The Definition of Public Use
Despite assertions to the contrary from beyond the Court, all of the
Justices apparently agreed that facts of Kelo were within the orbit of Berman and Midkiff. Highlighting the weight of precedent that favored New
London on the public use issue, Justice Stevens remarked that ruling in
favor of Susette Kelo on the public use issue would have overturned a century of precedent that instructed the court to apply a broad interpretation
of "public use. " 146 Limiting her review to the last half of the twentieth
century,147 Justice O'Connor commented that "[t]here is a sense in which
this troubling result follows from errant language in Berman and Midkiff. "148 The Justice's description of the language in Midkiff as "errant" is
particularly noteworthy because she authored Midkiff, which garnered unanimous support from the Court. 49 Similarly, Justice Thomas suggested
142.

Comment, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE

L.J. 599, 613-14 (1949).

143.
James W. Ely Jr., "PoorRelation" Once More: The Supreme Court and the Vanishing Rights
of Property Owners, 2004-05 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 39, 64.
144.
Timothy Sandefur, Mine and Thine Distinct: What Kelo Says About Our Path, 10 CHAP. L.
REv. 1, 43 (2006).
145.
For more commentary on the point, see, for example, Orlando E. Delogu, Kelo v. City of

New London--Wrongly Decided and a Missed Opportunity for PrincipledLine Drawing with Respect to Eminent Domain Takings, 58 ME. L. REv. 17, 19-30 (2006), and Gideon Kanner, Kelo v.
New London: Bad Law, Bad Policy, and Bad Judgment, 38 URB. LAW. 201, 208-18 (2006).
146.
See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483 (instructing that "[flor more than a century, our public use jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures
broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of the takings power").
147.
See id. at 496-501 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
148.
Id. at 501.
149.
Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 231 (1984).
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that the main problem with Berman and Midkiff was that "[once one permits takings for public purposes in addition to public uses, no coherent
principle limits what could constitute a valid public use." 5 ° Thus, all of
the Justices seemed to agree that applying the broad interpretation of public use from the Court's precedent to the facts of Kelo would make the
result, more or less, a foregone conclusion.
Though they may have agreed on the apparent applicability of
precedent, the dissenting Justices attempted to free Kelo from the strictures
of precedent. To distinguish Kelo from Berman and her own decision in
Midkiff, Justice O'Connor compared the relationship of the taking to the
harm to be averted in each of the three cases. In Berman and Midkiff, "the
extraordinary, precondemnation use of the targeted property inflicted affirmative harm on society."' 5' The blighted properties harmed society in
Berman while the concentration of fee simple titles had a detrimental impact on Hawaii's market for fee simple titles in Midkiff. 52 In those cases,
"each taking directly achieved a public benefit, it did not matter that the
property was turned over to private use."' 153 But in Kelo, neither Susette
Kelo's home nor those of her fellow condemnees inflicted "any social
harm" on society because the homes had not been classified as blighted.'4
As a result, the public benefit in Kelo was one step removed from the public benefits obtained in Berman and Midkiff-the government had to transfer the property to a private party for the public to benefit from the economic development that justified the taking.' 55 Compared to the "direct"
public benefits associated with the takings in Berman and Midkiff, Justice
O'Connor classified the public benefits in Kelo as "incidental"; 56 therefore, New London's
plan violated the public use requirement of the Fifth
57
Amendment. 1
While Justice O'Connor's distinction has appeal, the facts of Kelo are
not all that different from its twentieth century predecessors. The key distinction Justice O'Connor makes is that in Berman and Midkiff, "each taking directly achieved a public benefit, it did not matter that the property
was turned over to private use" whereas the public benefit in Kelo arose
only after the post-condemnation transfer of the property to Pfizer.'58 Describing the condemnations using that language suggests a two-step
process: 1) a harm-eliminating taking that vests title in a condemning au150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Kelo, 545 U.S. at 520 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 500 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
See id.
Id.
Id. at 475, 500.
See id. at 501.
Id.
See id. at 505.
Id. at 500.
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thority and 2) a subsequent transfer to a third party. But if an eminent domain transaction involves two-steps, the takings in Berman and Midkiff did
nothing to ameliorate blight or break up the concentration of fee simples in
Hawaii. The takings simply made the condemning authority the record
owner of condemned property.' 59 To that end, post-condemnation transfer
to private parties had to be part of the calculus in both cases unless the
government intended to retain title to the property. And in Berman, the
express terms of the DCRA reflect a contrary intention-the DCRA permitted private parties to be the primary agents of redevelopment with the
associated benefits. 16° Justice Kennedy even commented that "everybody
knows that private developers were the beneficiaries in Berman" during
Kelo's oral arguments.' 6' Similarly, the fee simples acquired by eminent
domain in Midkiff had to be redistributed to citizens who were not already
members of the land oligopoly.1 62 Without redistribution, the land oligopoly remained intact, albeit with a new member of the fee simple oligopoly63
the State of Hawaii. 1
If condemnations involve the two-step process posited by Justice
O'Connor, the distinctions between Berman, Midkiff, and Kelo become
very difficult to discern. Much like the proposals in Berman and Midkiff,
obtaining the public benefits of the plan in Kelo also necessitated the postcondemnation transfer of the acquired properties. To reap the benefits
associated with economic development, New London's plan required the
New London Development Corporation to transfer title to the properties to
Pfizer after the takings so that Pfizer could construct its facility. 64 Without
such a transfer, the New London Development Corporation would retain
title to the acquired properties. 65 Given the similarity of the transactions
in the three cases, either all of the takings produced "incidental" public
benefits or they all satisfied the broad interpretation of public use under
modem public use jurisprudence. No bright line exists by which to disaggregate "direct" public benefits from those deemed "incidental." Whatever line exists, or might exist, is very, very blurry.
Rather than attempt to distinguish Kelo from Berman and Midkiff, Justice Thomas would simply overrule the entire line of precedent that broadly interpreted "public use."" 6 According to Justice Thomas's public use
genealogy, the Court began its misguided trek toward its modern broad
159.
See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 233-34 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26, 28-30 (1954).
160.
Berman, 348 U.S. at 30.
161.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108), available at
http://www.ij.org/pdffolder/privateproperty/kelo/kelo-ussc-transcript.pdf.
162.
See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 233-34.
163.
See id.
164.
See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 474-75.
165.
See id. at 473-75.
166.
Id. at 521 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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interpretation of the public use limitation in FalibrookIrrigationDistrictv.
Bradley. 167 Justice Thomas notes that, in Bradley, the Court examined
whether the condemnation of land for an irrigation project constituted a
valid public use. 161 Justice Thomas's interpretation of the language in
Bradley not only suggested that the Court's conflation of public use with
public purpose was unnecessary, but also that the Court could have, in
fact, decided that case using the narrower "actual use by the public
test." 69 The statute at issue in Bradley provided that "'[a]ll landowners in
the district have the right to a proportionate share of the water.""' 7 For
Justice Thomas, this meant that the "'public' [had] the right to use the
irrigation ditch because all similarly situated members of the public-those

who owned lands irrigated by the ditch-had a right to use

"171
it.

However, Justice Thomas's description of Bradley's facts reveals that
they are much closer to those of Kelo than they may appear upon first
blush. According to Justice Thomas, the beneficiaries of the irrigation
project in Bradley were "landowners.""7 But landowners are a subset of
the general public, which means that the general public did not, in fact,
have a right to use the water flowing through the irrigation ditch. As evidence that the use in Bradley was less "public" than Justice Thomas's description suggests, Justice Peckham opined that "[t]he water is not used
for general, domestic or for drinking purposes, and it is plain from the
scheme of the act that the water is intended for the use of those who will
have occasion to use it on their lands. ""' In other words, the general public would not actually "use" the water, but only a much smaller category
of individuals- "landowners" with a right to use the water-would actually use the water from the irrigation ditch. Interestingly, Justice Peckham
commented that "landowners" with an excess of water have the authority
to "sell or assign the surplus or the whole of the water as he may
choose."'" So, private "landowners" who received the sole benefit of the
irrigation project could sell all of the water for financial gain, which looks
eerily reminiscent of the facts in Kelo.
The financial gain accruing to private parties is not the only similarity
between Bradley and Kelo-the facts of both cases meet the strictures of
Justice Thomas's narrow test for the Public Use Clause. Much post-Kelo
commentary focused on Pfizer and the financial gain it stood to accrue

167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 515 (citing Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896)).
Id.
See id. at 515-16.
Id. at 515 (alteration in original) (quoting Bradley, 164 U.S. at 162).

171.

Id.

172.

See id.

173.
174.

Bradley, 164 U.S. at 162.
Id.
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under the redevelopment proposal. 75 However, Pfizer was not the sole
beneficiary of New London's redevelopment plan. The plan included the
construction of a hotel, a marina for "tourist boaters," a "public walkway
along the waterfront," "eighty new residences" connected to the rest of
the development by a "public walkway," and a relocated Coast Guard
Museum open to the public.' 76 Furthermore, the plan contemplated the
construction of a "major health club complex" that would be open to the
public." These aspects of the plan satisfy Justice Thomas's narrow test
because the public would be able "to use"-in the narrow sense-some of
the properties marked for acquisition under the redevelopment proposal. In
fact, a plausible argument can be made that Kelo conforms more closely to
the requirements of the narrow interpretation of public use than Bradley.
Applying the "actual use by the public" test'78 to the facts on Kelo
highlights the complexities associated with using it as the barometer to
determine whether or not any given justification for eminent domain is a
constitutional "public use." New London's plan involved a number of
narrowly defined "public" uses, but do those uses in the aggregate rise to
a sufficient level to satisfy the "actual use by the public" test? What proportion of the public must be able to use the acquired properties postcondemnation? Presumably, the entire public could use the "public walkway along the waterfront" 179 while only Pfizer's employees or guests
could gain access to the research and development facility. 8 ° But, Pfizer's
employees are members of the public so how does their use of the property factor into the "actual use by the public" test? These are precisely the
kinds of questions that the majority opinion avoided for a very simple reason-they cannot be answered in a manner that provides stability and predictability in the law.
The conundrum facing the dissenting Justices, or any other court for
that matter, is that it is difficult to create a workable public use test that
can be applied to the variety of situations that create eminent domain controversies. Justice O'Connor's distinction between "direct" and "incidental" public benefits is unworkable because of the imperceptible line between benefits that are "direct" and those that are indirect or "incidental."
Indeed, the linguistic distinction between direct/indirect public benefits
harks back to the now discredited direct/indirect assessment used to identify appropriate exercises of Commerce Clause power in cases like United
States v. E.C. Knight Co.' 81 Moreover, the public-private nature of most
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

See, e.g., Richman, supra note 32.
Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 509 (Conn. 2004), aff'd, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
Id. at 509 n.5.
See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 479 (describing the "use by the public test").
Kelo, 843 A.2d at 509.
See id.
Compare United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 17 (1895), abrogatedby Wickard v.
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eminent domain actions would ensnare the "actual use by the public" test
in a series of fact-sensitive inquiries that would lead to unpredictable results." 2 Recognizing its historical inability to articulate a meaningful public use standard, the majority in Kelo deferred to the decision-making ca'
pabilities of local legislatures just like in Berman and Midkiff. 83
B. JudicialDeference to Local Determinationsof Public Use
Similar to the agreement regarding the application of precedent to the
public use issue, all of the Justices agreed, at least in principle, that the
Court should not "second guess" the wisdom of local legislatures as a
general matter."&4 The underlying justification for the deference afforded
local decision-making processes stems from the comparative institutional
competencies to make such decisions. Federal courts are removed from
the exigencies that spur local authorities to exercise the power of eminent
domain. Therefore, an informational asymmetry exists between federal
judges and local decision-makers. As a result, federal courts are loath to
overturn local decisions. The Court provided one of its most elegant explanations of the reason to defer to local decisions in Clark v. Nash.'85 In
Clark, Justice Peckham wrote that
Where the use is asserted to be public, and the right of the individual to condemn land for the purpose of exercising such use is
founded upon or is the result of some peculiar condition of the soil
or climate, or other peculiarity of the State, where the right of
condemnation is asserted under a state statute, we are always,
where it can fairly be done, strongly inclined to hold with the state
courts, when they uphold a state statute providing for such condemnation. The validity of such statutes may sometimes depend
upon many different facts, the existence of which would make a
public use, even by an individual, where, in the absence of such
facts, the use would clearly be private. Those facts must be general, notorious and acknowledged in the State, and the state courts

Filburn, 317 U.S. Ill (1942) (holding that "the fact, as we have seen, that trade or commerce might
be indirectly affected was not enough to entitle complainants to a decree"), with Perez v. United
States, 402 U.S. 146, 151-52 (1971) (stating that "activity . . . may still ... be reached by Congress
if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and this [is] irrespective of whether
such effect is what might at some earlier time have been defined as 'direct' or 'indirect'" (quoting
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125)).
Justice Stevens noted that the narrow interpretation of "public use" withered over time be182.
cause it proved to be "difficult to administer... [and] impractical given the diverse and always evolving needs of society." Kelo, 545 U.S. at 479.
183.
See id. at 481-83.
184.
See id. at 488; id. at 499 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 520 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
185.
198 U.S. 361 (1905).
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may be assumed to be exceptionally familiar with them. They are
not the subject of judicial investigation as to their existence, but
the local courts know and appreciate them. They understand the
situation which led to the demand for the enactment of the statute,
and they also appreciate the results upon the growth and prosperity
of the State, which in all probability would flow from a denial of
its validity.' 86
Simply put, "judges do not have the equipment they would need if they
were to try to determine the likely consequences of their decisions for the
total pattern of social activity" when confronted by some issues within the
courtroom. 187
Decisions associated with the exercise of eminent domain are prime
candidates for deference because they mingle both specific findings and
non-quantifiable public-minded benefits. For example, the specific findings that justified the condemnation in Berman included that "64.3% of
the dwellings were beyond repair, 18.4% needed major repairs, only
17.3 % were satisfactory."' 8 8 If the standard for evaluating proposed public
uses involved precise quantities, the Court could use such evidence as a
metric for its decision. However, the Court identified a less precise justification that satisfied the public use requirement-"public welfare. , 89 In a
statement that is noteworthy because of its breadth, the Court stated that
"[t]he concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values it
represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary." 9 ° A court is well beyond its decision-making comfort zone if part
of the justification for an exercise of eminent domain mixes quantifiable
variables with "spiritual" or "aesthetic" considerations.
From the perspective of political philosophy, the deference granted to
legislative judgments regarding eminent domain is the product of the philosophies that informed its enactment. Although disagreement exists about
the degree of influence,'' historians generally acknowledge that one phi186.
Id. at 367-68.
187.
Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685,
1752 (1976). Kennedy also commented that "rational result orientation requires factual inquiries that
are at once particularized and wide-ranging." Id.

188.

See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 30 (1954) (the full recitation of the underlying facts was

that "[tihe first.project undertaken under the Act relates to Project Area B in Southwest Washington,
D.C. In 1950 the Planning Commission prepared and published a comprehensive plan for the District.
Surveys revealed that in Area B, 64.3% of the dwellings were beyond repair, 18.4% needed major
repairs, only 17.3% were satisfactory; 57.8% of the dwellings had outside toilets, 60.3% had no
baths, 29.3% lacked electricity, 82.2% had no wash basins or laundry tubs, 83.8% lacked central
heating").
189.
Id. at 33.
190.
Id.
191.
Stephen A. Siegel, The Marshall Court and Republicanism, 67 TEX. L. REv. 903, 917 (1989)
(book review). The topic of republicanism and its influence on the founding generation is quite corn-
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losophy played a central role in shaping the early history of this nation and
its laws, including property law-republicanism. 192 History instructed the
Founders that past republics had died from "luxury," a sense of satisfaction, and an earnest desire for greater personal gain, which ignited envy in
citizens and subsequent conflict. 193 To escape the seduction of individualism that ruined prior republics, the Founders embraced a brand of republicanism that instructed that "the common good would be the only objective
of government."" The welfare of the public, according to Thomas Paine,
was "wholly characteristical of the purport, matter, or object for which
government ought to be instituted, and on which it is to be employed, respublica, the public affairs, or the public good; or, literally translated, the
public thing."'9 5 The essence of republicanism was the "sacrifice of individual interests to the greater good of the whole."' 96 Early American law
is replete with examples of this all for one and one for all mentality. Price
and wage controls, constitutional provisions prohibiting monopolies, along
with other economic regulations all highlight the emphasis on the body
politic as a whole rather than the individual. 97 According
to one historian,
198
"[i]deally, republicanism obliterated the individual."
Defining republicanism as the virtual obliteration of the individual
leaves little room for individual accomplishment. However, the elevation
of the public good above individualism illuminates a second aspect of republicanism-faith that a sovereign will wield power for the good of the
people.'99 Republican principles encouraged individual citizens to participate in the decision-making processes of the community." ° If individual
interests were subservient to the public good, legislatures would advance
the public welfare because they were aggregates of individuals seeking to
promote the public good.2°I Republican deference to legislative prerogative
plex and beyond the scope of this paper. The book review cited in this footnote provides further detail
regarding the meaning of republicanism to the Founding Fathers and the dispute among historians
regarding the appropriate definition of republicanism.
192.
See id. at 913-17.
193.

GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 52 (1993).

194.
Id. at 52-54 (stating that "[tihe history of antiquity thus became a kind of laboratory in which
autopsies of the dead republics would lead to a science of social sickness and health matching the
science of the natural world").
195.

THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN: PART SECOND, in THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF THOMAS

PAINE
345,
369
(Philip
S.
Foner
ed.,
1969),
available
at
http://www.thomaspaine.org/Archives/ROMpart2.html.
196.
See WOOD, supra note 193, at 53.
197.
Id. at 63-64; see also JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 33 (1998).

198.
WOOD, supranote 193, at 61.
199.
Nathan Alexander Sales, Note, Classical Republicanism and the Fifth Amendment's "Public
Use" Requirement, 49 DUKE L.J. 339, 350 (1999).
200.
See Siegel, supra note 191, at 916 (commenting that "men ... most realized their humanity
when they participated in public, communal life").
201.
See WOOD, supra note 193, at 58.
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embraced the notion that "what was good for the whole community was
ultimately good for all the parts" of the community; individual prosperity
was directly proportional to community welfare.' To make that connection, republicanism presupposed that the "public" possessed a uniform set
of interests that could be advanced by legislative action. 2' Regardless of
the merits of that assumption, the public interest emerging from legislative
debate more closely approximated the public good than other forms of
decision-making, particularly that undertaken by aristocrats or royals.2 4
Passing legislation required a consensus of legislators and they were supposed to act pursuant to the public good, which made it difficult to pass
corrupt bills.' 5
Republicanism's emphasis on individual sacrifice and legislative deference threatened to eviscerate individual rights; therefore, liberalism
emerged as a philosophical competitor to challenge republican orthodoxy.
Contrary to republicanism's public-minded private citizen, liberalism
viewed a citizen as self-interested and disinclined to further the public
good as a general matter except for those members of the public whose
interests aligned with her own. 6 In fact, "[plublic life, in the liberal
view, involves just another forum in which individuals pursue their private
interests."27 And unlike republicanism's faith legislative deliberation, liberals argued that individual rights were not subject to political determination; they were "prepolitical" and could not be violated according to the
whims of the political process.2 8 For liberals, government existed to protect rights accruing to an individual by virtue of citizenship, not to promote the public welfare.2' 9
Madison's Takings Clause, both as originally written and as enacted
by Congress and the state legislatures, intertwines the philosophies of republicanism and liberalism.2 1° The Public Use Clause is imbued with republicanism: an individual property owner is required to sacrifice her
202.
Id.
203.
Id. at 57-58.
204.
William Michael Treanor, Note, The Originsand Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 701 (1985).
205.
See id.
206.
See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the
Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 782, 821 (1995) (observing that "[Iliberalism begins with the
belief that individuals are motivated primarily, if not wholly, by self-interest").
207.
See Siegel, supra note 191, at 916-17.
208.
See Treanor, supra note 206, at 821; see also Siegel, supra note 383, at 917 (stating that
"liberalism denies the possibility of a society having a public interest apart from the sum of its members' individual interests").
209.
Id.; see also Treanor, supra note 204, at 705 (stating that "[n]on-republicans . . . sought to
create a large sphere within which the individual could exercise privileges and enjoy immunities free
from state interference").
210.
See Treanor, supra note 206, at 819 (arguing that the Takings Clause embraces republican
ideals because government is barred from decreasing the value of property and liberal ideals in that
some rights are so fundamental as to be beyond deprivation due to political inequalities).

Alabama Law Review

(Vol. 59:3:561

property interest for the good of the public at the request of the government if the property taken is to be put to a "public use." A condemnation
for the good of the whole, as determined by the representative body of the
whole in good faith and for the welfare of the public, outweighs the individual right to private property. However, the property owner does not
bear the entire burden of eminent domain because the sovereign must provide the dispossessed owner with a "just compensation" in exchange for
the property. Thus, the "just compensation" requirement evokes the concern for individual rights and government protection of those rights associated with liberalism. Making the connection between the republicanism
and liberalism embodied by the Takings Clause, the Court in Armstrong v.
United States2"1' explained that
[t]he Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private property shall not
be taken for a public use without just compensation was designed
to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public
burde.As which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole. 212
Regardless of its historical foundation, the Court's deference to local
determinations in eminent domain cases seems like an outlier given its
willingness to interfere with state decisions encompassing other substantive
areas of the law. 2" In his dissent, Justice Thomas suggests that the Court
does not hesitate to inject itself into local affairs in search and seizure cases despite its reluctance to "construe the Constitution so as to intrude upon
the administration of justice by the individual States.,, 214 By the same token, the Court willingly invalidates state decisions in the area of family
law even though "[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband
and wife, parent and child, belong[ed] to the laws of the states, and not to
the laws of the United States." 215 To take but one example, the statute at

211.

364 U.S. 40 (1960).

212.
Id. at 49.
213.
Ely, supra note 143, at 62 (stating that "among all the guarantees of the Bill of Rights, only
the public use limitation is singled out for heavy deference").
214.
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 518 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting); accord
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201 (1977); see also Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 134
(1954) ("Even as to the substantive rule governing federal searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment, both the Court and individual Justices have wavered considerably. Never until June of 1949 did
this Court hold the basic search-and-seizure prohibition in any way applicable to the states under the
Fourteenth Amendment. At that time, as we pointed out, thirty-one states were not following the
federal rule excluding illegally obtained evidence, while sixteen were in agreement with it. Now that
the Wolf doctrine is known to them, state courts may wish further to reconsider their evidentiary rules.
But to upset state convictions even before the states have had adequate opportunity to adopt or reject
the rule would be an unwarranted use of federal power. The chief burden of administering criminal
justice rests upon state courts." (citations omitted)).
215.
Ex parne Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890).
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issue in Lawrence v. Texas had both criminal and family law elements that
subjected some citizens for grossly unfair treatment. 2" The Court declined
to defer to Texas's sovereign authority to enact and enforce criminal law
or its traditional power to regulate family relationships; its statute went too
far notwithstanding the historical authority of states over the subject matters of the statute.217
Though they regulate very different areas of everyday life, family law
and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence have a common animating theme:
the protection of privacy. From early twentieth century cases like Meyer v.
t and Pierce v. Society of Sisters
21 9 to later cases like Roe v.
Nebraskad
Wade,22 the story of twentieth century family law is the story of the evolution of privacy as a legal right. 22 ' For example, the right of privacy
transformed abortion from a criminal act to a fundamental right protected
by the Constitution.222 Similarly, the Court has explicitly linked Fourth
Amendment protections to privacy. In United States v. Miller, for example, the Court commented that "'no interest legitimately protected by the
Fourth Amendment' is implicated by governmental investigative activities
unless there is an intrusion into a zone of privacy, into 'the security a man
relies upon when he places himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area.'"223 In other words, "[tihe security of one's privacy
against arbitrary intrusion ...is at the core of the Fourth Amendment."224
Whether the context is family law or Fourth Amendment law, the definition of privacy reflects the essential value associated with liberalism:
allowing the individual to pursue her interests or make decisions free from
governmental intrusion. Reflecting the individual-focused nature of privacy within family law, the Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird described the right
of privacy as "the right of the individual, married or single, to be free

216.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562-63 (2003).
217.
Id. at 567-71.
218.
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
219.
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
220.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
221.
For a general overview of the increasing importance of private-ordering and family law, see
Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1443, 1444-46. See also
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, PRIVATE LIVES: FAMILIES, INDIVIDUALS, AND THE LAW 1-16 (2005).

222.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-54.
223.
425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976) (quoting Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301-02 (1966)); see
also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) ("the application of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person invoking its protection can claim a 'justifiable,' a 'reasonable,' or a
'legitimate expectation of privacy' that has been invaded by government action").
224.
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961);
see, e.g., Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1335, 1359 (describing
"the criminal procedural aspect of privacy as: '[the] maxim of the common law which secures to the
citizen immunity in his home against the prying eyes of the government, and protection in person,
property, and papers even against the process of law, except in a few specified cases'" (quoting
COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 28, at 299-300)).
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from unwarranted governmental intrusion."225 Even if the public takes a
dim view of an individual's relationship, the fundamental right of privacy
paves the way for an individual to make that choice in her own best interests. Similarly, the Fourth Amendment protects the individual from state
intrusion despite the state's interest in the enforcement of its criminal
laws. 226 The Fourth Amendment barrier that protects the individual has the
right of privacy at its foundation, which reflects liberalism's conception of
the importance of the individual vis-A-vis the public. Though no right is
absolute, the individual is at the center of privacy; the public is largely
excluded from areas blanketed by the protection of privacy.
Comparing the philosophical underpinnings of the Fourth Amendment
or family law with those of the Takings Clause illuminates one justification for the Court's lesser degree of deference in cases involving the former subjects when compared to issues involving the latter.227 Privacy and
its liberal focus on the individual is the nucleus of family law and Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.228 As a result, more aggressive examinations
are necessary to protect the individual from public intrusion into a protected zone of activity. In contrast, the public is inextricably connected to
the Takings Clause limitations on eminent domain in an inclusive manner.229 The inherent eminent domain power of the sovereign establishes its
right to acquire property so long as the republican and liberal elements of
the Takings Clause are satisfied.23 ° The republicanism and liberalism that
serve as the foundation of the Takings Clause are inclusive of the public,
whereas the liberalism of privacy jurisprudence is exclusive of the public.
Because local governments or agencies are charged with divining the public welfare, courts defer to them based upon their intimate knowledge of
local conditions in Takings Clause cases in a manner that is inapplicable
when the locus of the inquiry inherently excludes the public.
IV. POST-KELO LEGISLATIVE REFORM

Almost one year to the day after Kelo, the shockwaves that erupted in
the aftermath of the decision reached the Oval Office. On June 23, 2006,

225.
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
226.
Adrienne Wineholt, Note, Georgia v. Randolph: Checking Potential Defendants' Fourth
Amendment Rights at the Door, 66 MD. L. REv. 475, 478-79 (2007).
227.
See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: ConstitutionalMyths and
the Casefor Caution, 102 MIcH. L. REv. 801, 803-04 (2004).
228.
See Naomi R. Calm, Models of Family Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1225, 124142
(1999).
229.
See Jane B. Baron, Winding Toward the Heart of the Takings Muddle: Kelo, Lingle, and
PublicDiscourse About Private Property, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 613, 614-16 (2007).
230.
See supra notes 192-212 and accompanying text.
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President Bush signed an anti-Kelo executive order entitled: "Protecting
the Property Rights of the American People. " 23' The order limited
the taking of private property by the Federal Government to situations in which the taking is for public use, with just compensation,
and for the purpose of benefiting the general public and not merely
for the purpose of advancing the economic interest of private parties to be given ownership or use of the property taken.232
Rather than being issued by the executive branch of government, however, most of the anti-Kelo crusade occurred in legislatures around the
country. On the national level, the United States House of Representatives
passed the Private Property Rights Protection Act of 2005,233 but the act
stalled in the United States Senate and has yet to become law. 234 With far
more success, state legislatures hurriedly enacted an array of legislative
measures aimed at curbing the government's ability to acquire land by
eminent domain.235 While most of the reforms on the state level are statutory, the Louisiana and South Carolina state legislatures passed constitutional amendments that were placed on the November 2006 ballot.236 Both
measures received sufficient voter support to become part of the constitutions of those two states.237 Regardless of the form, state legislatures
reacted quickly, and negatively, to Kelo.
A. State Legislative Responses to Kelo
Despite claims that it would "hinder the revitalization of inner cities,, 23 the Florida legislature enacted one of the more, if not the most,
stringent set of post-Kelo restrictions on the authority of the government to
exercise its power of eminent domain. On its face, Florida's constitution
seems to embrace a broad view of what satisfies its requirements by using
231.
232.
233.
House,

Exec. Order No. 13,406, 71 Fed. Reg. 36,973, 36,973 (June 23, 2006).
Id.
Private Property Rights Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 4128, 109th Cong. (2005). In the
the bill passed by a wide margin (376-38). See Library of Congress, Thomas, Search Results

H.R. 4128, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-binlbdquery/z?d109:HRO4128:@@@R

(last visited Jan. 28,

2008).
234.
For a description of the bill's history, see Ronald D. Utt, States Vote to Strengthen Property
Rights,
BACKGROUNDER,
Feb.
1,
2007,
available
at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/SmartGrowth/uploadlbg_2002.pdf.
235.
Id. at 2-4.
236. Id.
237. Id.; National Conference of State Legislatures, Property Rights Issues on the 2006 Ballot,
http://www.ncsl.orgstatevote/proprights06.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2008) (Louisiana' measure
received 55% of the vote while South Carolina's measure received 86% of the vote).
238. Carrie Weimar, Crimping Eminent Domain, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, Nov. 13, 2006, at lB.
Utah took steps to modify its eminent domain regulations before the Court decided Kelo. See UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-34-1 (West 2002 & Supp. 2007).
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the word "purpose" instead of the word "use."239 Article X, § 6(a) declares that "[n]o private property shall be taken except for a public purpose
and with full compensation. "240 Whatever its connotation before Kelo, the

meaning of the word "purpose" in Florida's constitution narrowed considerably during eminent domain's "summer of scrutiny." Florida's legislative amendments barred governmental agencies with the power of eminent
domain from conveying property acquired by that power "to a natural
person or private entity." 24 Not satisfied with that barrier, Florida went
one step further in its statutory amendments by prohibiting the exercise of
eminent domain "for the purpose of abating or eliminating a public nuisance" or "for the purpose of preventing or eliminating slum or blight conditions." 242 With the legislative amendments in place, Florida's interpretation of "public purpose" is far narrower than the definition of "public use"
in cases like Berman, Midklff, and Kelo.
Most of the legislative reforms, however, were modest when compared to Florida's sweeping restrictions on the use of eminent domain for
just about any purpose. Missouri changed its eminent domain statutes so
that "[n]o condemning authority shall acquire private property through the
process of eminent domain for solely economic development purposes. "243
To supplement its ban, Missouri decided that "economic development"
purposes included increasing the "tax base, tax revenues, employment,
and general economic health." 2 " Apparently troubled by the expansive
connotation of the word "purpose," Kentucky decided to strike the word
"purpose" from its eminent domain statutes in its entirety.245 So, Kentucky
redefined "condemn" as taking "private property for a public use [formerly purpose] under the right of eminent domain" and "eminent domain" as
"the right of the Commonwealth to take for a public use [formerly purpose]."246 As for the newly minted "public uses" that satisfied Kentucky
law, the legislature declared that:
[nlo provision in the law of the Commonwealth shall be construed
to authorize the condemnation of private property for transfer to a
private owner for the purpose of economic development that benefits the general public only indirectly, such as by increasing the tax

239.
See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(a).
240.
Id.
241.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 73.013(1) (West 1999 & Supp. 2008).
242.
Id. § 73.014(1)-(2).
243.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 523.271(1) (West 2002 & Supp. 2007).
244.
Id. § 523.271(2).
245.
See H.B. 508, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2006), codified at KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 416.540
(West 2005 & Supp. 2007).
246.
Id. (emphasis removed)
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base, tax revenues, employment, or by promoting the general eco-

nomic health of the community.247
Unlike Florida's muscular approach to eminent domain reform, the Mis-

souri and Kentucky bans on eminent domain did not apply if the purpose
of the condemnation
was to eliminate "blighted, substandard, or unsanita24
ry conditions. ,
Many legislatures kept the elimination of blight on the list of constitutional uses for eminent domain, but redefined what constituted "blight" for

condemnation purposes in an effort to reduce the number of properties
eligible for acquisition. Pennsylvania, for example, modified the definition
of blight as set forth in its Urban Redevelopment Law, which was enacted
in 1945 ,249 The mid-twentieth century statute defined blight by reference to

seven factors: (1) unsafe, unsanitary, inadequate or over-crowded conditions of the houses in the particular area; (2) inadequate planning in the
area; (3) excessive land coverage by the buildings in the area; (4) lack of

adequate light and air and open space; (5) the defective design and arrangement of the buildings in the area; (6) faulty street layout; or (7) land
uses in the area which are economically or socially undesirable. 2" Following Kelo, Pennsylvania's twenty-first century statutory definition of blight
expanded the list of characteristics that defined blight to a robust twelve

factors.2 1 Among the new factors that described blighted areas were facts
that constituted a "public nuisance at common law," an "attractive nuisance to children," buildings that were "vermin infested," lots or parcels

that become "a haven for rodents," or properties classified as "dbandoned.",252 The existence of any of the twelve factors provides the con247.
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 416.675(3) (West 2005 & supp. 2007).
248.
Id. § 416.675(2)(c) ("for the purpose of eliminating blighted areas, slum areas, or substandard
and insanitary areas .... ."); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 523.271(2) (West 2002 & Supp. 2007).
249.
1945 Pa. Laws 991, codified as amended at 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1702 (West 1997 &
Supp. 2007).
250.
35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1702(a).
251.
26 id. § 205(b)(1)-(12).
252.
Id. For a similar approach, see the statutory changes to Alabama's definition of blight in the
aftermath of Kelo. Title 24, chapter 2 of the 1975 Alabama Code, for example, permitted cities to
acquire blighted properties for redevelopment purposes. The Code defined "blighted areas" as portions
of the community with "buildings or improvements which, by reason of dilapidation, obsolescence,
overcrowding, faulty arrangement or design, lack of ventilation, light and sanitary facilities, excessive
land coverage, deleterious land use or obsolete layout, or any combination of these or other factors,
are detrimental to the safety, health, morals or welfare of the community." ALA. CODE § 24-2-2(c)(1)
(2000 & Supp. 2007). Alabama continued to allow eminent domain to be deployed for purposes of
urban renewal, but stated that the power could not be used "to acquire property that is not blighted
without the consent of the owner." Id. § 24-2-2(b). According to the new Alabama statute, no less
than nine characteristics could be assessed to determine if property was sufficiently "blighted" for
eminent domain purposes. See id. § 24-2-2(c) Buildings "unfit for human habitation or occupancy,"
id. § 24-2-2(c)(1), property with population densities that impair the safety of inhabitants, id. § 24-22(c)(2), or vacant land that had become "overgrown with noxious weeds," id. § 24-2-2-(c)(5), or
constituted a "haven for mosquitoes" were all outside the bounds of Alabama's new restrictions, id.
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demning authority with the power to acquire the affected property by eminent domain.253
B. Criticism of Post-Kelo Legislation
Despite the legislative effort, the final legislative products have been
roundly criticized. The primary objection to the reform measures can be
succinctly expressed: the amended statutory definitions of "blight" are so
vague that they fail to act as a meaningful restraint on the government's
power of eminent domain.254 The problem is that many, if not all, of the
qualities that characterize blighted property escape precise definition.
Commonly enumerated blighting factors in existing or amended blight
statutes include the presence of dilapidated structures, vermin infestation,
obsolescent planning, or obstacles to sound growth.255 However, no definition of malleable factors such as "obsolescent planning" or "sound
growth" exists. The absence of accepted definitions for many of these factors permits a condemning authority to sweep just about any parcel of real
property into the eminent domain net. For example, a New York court
upheld a condemnation of private properties around Times Square because
a state agency had labeled the property to be acquired as blighted because
they were "substandard or unsanitary" and "impairs sound growth and
development."25 6 Given the definitional vagaries that permeate much of the
post-Kelo legislation, critics contend that the reforms merely preserve the
status quo; nothing has been done to impede the exercise of eminent domain. 257
More ominously, advocates of stronger eminent domain measures fear
that the meager protections offered by many post-Kelo measures permit
eminent domain to be used by the politically powerful to exploit the politi253.
26 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 205(b)(1)-(12). The Pennsylvania bill applies to a single parcel
of property. Id. Similar standards apply to proposals that require the acquisition of multiple parcels of
land. Id. § 205(c).
254.
See Timothy Sandefur, The "Backlash" So Far: Will Americans Get Meaningful Eminent
Domain Reform?, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REv. 709, 725 (stating that "[diefinitions of 'blight' are generally vague enough to allow condemnation of almost any property"); Ilya Somin, Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings After Kelo, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REv. 183, 266 (2007)
(commenting that "[a] sufficiently expansive definition of blight is essentially equivalent to authorizing
economic development takings").
255.
For a list of factors included in blight statutes, see Hudson Hayes Luce, The Meaning of
Blight: A Survey of Statutory and Case Law, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.J. 389, 394-404 (2000).
256.
W. 41st St. Realty v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 744 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (N.Y. App. Div.
2002) (other factors included "a plan for clearance, replanning, reconstruction and rehabilitation of
that area; and, . . . the plan affords maximum participation by private enterprise." The property was
to be conveyed to the New York Times so that it could construct a new headquarters on the land.).
257.
See, e.g., David Barron, Eminent Domain is Dead! (Long Live Eminent Domain!), BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 16, 2006, at DI, available at 2006 WLNR 6439454 (characterizing post-Kelo reforms as
having "more bark than bite"); Terry Pristin, Voters Back Limits on Eminent Domain, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 15, 2006, at C6 (reporting that "[e]minent domain specialists on both sides ... say many of the
statutes enacted by state legislatures have few teeth").
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cally disempowered for financial gain. To support the point, critics point
to eminent domain's unfortunate history of abuse. 2 8 Indeed, Justice Thomas's dissent alludes to the abuse of eminent domain in the past and its
destructive consequences for those who suffered as a result of eminent
domain abuse.259 For example, the mid-twentieth century witnessed deplorable uses of eminent domain to wipe out vibrant racial communities on

Chicago's Southside and Philadelphia's Society Hill.' Moreover, studies
have shown that racial minorities have suffered a disproportionate degree
of harm as a result of urban renewal programs premised on the eradication
of blight in the past. 261 Given its checkered history, critics fear that the
limited protection offered by post-Kelo reforms dooms some communities
to experience a repeat of the past abuse suffered at the hands of condemn-

ing authorities.
C. Impediments to Legislative Reform
The relative absence of aggressive post-Kelo modifications to the laws
that regulate eminent domain is surprising given the depth of public senti-

ment against the decision. Public opinion polls unanimously showed that
the public disagreed with the Court's holding in Kelo. For example, a
whopping ninety-seven percent of respondents in an MSNBC poll rejected

the idea that economic development justified the loss of private property,
even if the public benefited from the project.262 Furthermore, a Wall Street
Journal survey found that protecting "private-property rights" was the
number one legal issue that concerned the public after Kelo, which is revealing given the degree to which other legal issues, like abortion, have
captured the public's attention.263 With this outward expression of public
discontent, one might have expected state legislatures to react to Kelo by
258.
See Daniel B. Kelly, The "Public Use" Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A Rationale
Based on Secret Purchasesand PrivateInfluence, 92 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 39-41 (2006).
259.
See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 521-22 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
260.
Wendell E. Pritchett, The "PublicMenace" of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses of
Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 1, 33-35 (2003) (Chicago's Southside); Derek Werner,
Note, The Public Use Clause, Common Sense and Takings, 10 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 335, 350-51
(2001) (Philadelphia's Society Hill).
261.
Werner, supra note 260, at 350-57; see also Brief of Amici Curiae NAACP et al. in Support
of Petitioners at 7-15, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108), 2004 WL 2811057.
262.
MSNBC,
Live
Vote:
Property
Rights
and
Private
Projects,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8331958/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2008) (vote to see results). For a list of
other polls and associated results, see Castle Coalition, The Polls Are In: Americans Overwhelmingly
Oppose
Use
of
Eminent
for
Domain
Private
Gain,
http://www.castlecoalition.org/resources/Kelojpolls.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2008).
263.
John Harwood, Public Splits on How Supreme Court Pick Should Interpret Constitution,
WALL ST. J., July 15, 2005, at A4. A November 2005 Wall Street Journal/NBC poll reported that the
number one legal issue that concerned the public had nothing to do with the always contentious right to
abortion or the right to die. Instead, protecting "private-property rights" was the legal issue that
created the most concern for the survey's participants.
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enacting aggressive measures to clamp down on eminent domain. However, the legislatures did not enact reforms that gutted the power of eminent
domain; they opted for measures that took a more middle-of-the-road approach by barring the specific exercises of eminent domain that incited the
anti-Kelo public outcry.2 6
History provides a launching point for the search into the reasons for
the unexpectedly circumscribed post-Kelo legislative approach. In his famous Federalist 10, James Madison argued that the "public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties" and that "the superior force of an
interested and overbearing majority" often proved to be outcome determinative in legislative halls.265 Madison referred to these interested parties
as "factions," which consisted of a group of citizens "united and actuated
by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights
of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community. ,26 Furthermore, Madison observed that "the most common and
durable source of factions, has been the various and unequal distribution
of property. Those who hold, and those who are without property, have
ever formed distinct interests in society. , 267 Although the causes of faction
could not be eliminated, the deleterious effects of faction could be reduced
by the structure of a republican govemment. 268
The modem-day embodiment of Madison's theory of faction emerged
from the marriage of political science and economics: public choice
theory.269 Public choice theory depicts the legislature as an economic marketplace where organized members of the public and individual legislators
enter into a mutually beneficial legislative relationship. 27' Legislative outcomes reflect a Byzantine mix of the relative effectiveness of an organization's influence at the time of the vote on a particular issue and the individual legislator's gauge of the political consequences of that vote.27' Because different organizations have different views of the same issue, the
process by which legislation is enacted is the equivalent of a tug-of-war

264.
See, e.g., John E. Kramer & Lisa Knepper, One Year After Kelo Argument National Property
Rights Revolt Still Going Strong: 43 Legislatures Work Toward Eminent Domain Reform, INSTITUTE
FOR JUSTICE, Feb. 21, 2006, www.ij.org/privateproperty/connecticut/2_21_06pr.html.
265.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 42 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., Weslyean University
Press 1982).
266.
Id. at 43.
267.
Id. at 44.
268.
Id. at 45-49.
269.
Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of Madison's Vision of the State: A Public Choice Perspective, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1328, 1333 (1994) (referring to Madison as "the progenitor of modem public
choice theory"). The origin of public choice theory is often claimed to be Duncan Black's article On
the Rationale of Group Decision-Making, 56 J. POL. ECON. 23 (1948).
270.
Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groupsfor Political Influence, 98
Q.J. ECON. 371, 371-73 (1983).
271.
EARL LATHAM, THE GROUP BASIS OF POLITICS 35-36 (1952).
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between the conflicting interests of the organizations.272 The legislation
that emerges represents a "political equilibrium" between all of the interested parties.273
Today, Madison's factions are labeled special interest groups and
modem public choice theory places them at the center of the legislative
process. Members of the public coalesce around a common interest to
form groups that lobby legislators to produce legislation that is favorable
to their interests. 274 Because of the organizational costs associated with
large groups, lobbying groups that are small in number tend to be the most
effective.275 But whether large or small, special interest groups vie with
one another for favorable legislation within legislative halls. According to
William Landes and Richard Posner:
[t]he price that the winning group bids is determined both by the
value of legislative protection to the group's members and the
group's ability to overcome the free-rider problems that plague
coalitions. Payment takes the form of campaign contributions,
votes, implicit promises of future favors, and sometimes outright
bribes. In short, legislation is 'sold' by the legislature and 'bought'
by the beneficiaries of the legislation.276
In economic terms, special interest groups are "rent-seeking," which

means that groups pursue self-maximizing ends at the expense of the public welfare.277
Within legislatures, public choice theory posits that legislators align

with causes that maximize the probability of re-election.278 Legislators are
272.
See id.
273.
See Becker, supra note 270, at 371-73. For negative commentary regarding public choice
theory, see Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV.
703, 714 (1984), stating that "interest-group theory of legislation provides powerful evidence of the
persistence and extent of legislative abuse." See also Abner J. Mikva, Forward to Symposium on the
Theory of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 167, 167 (1988) ("The politicians and other people I have
known in public life just do not fit the 'rent-seeking' egoist model that the public choice theorists
offer. Perhaps I am still one of those naive citizens who believe that politics is on the square, that
majorities in effect make policy in this country, and that out of the clash of partisan debate and frequent elections 'good' public policy decisions emerge. Not even my five terms in the Illinois state
legislature-that last vestige of democracy in the 'raw'-nor my five terms in the United States Congress, prepared me for the villains of the public choice literature.").
274.
Becker, supra note 270, at 371. Becker denominates this behavior as "rent-seeking."
275.
See Jonathan R. Macy, Promoting Public-RegardingLegislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 231-32 (1986). For more on the organization of groups and their role in the legislative process, see generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1971).
276.
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group
Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975).
277.
Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REV.
873, 878 (1987).
278.
DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 22 (1991) (citing Barba-
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viewed as "egoistic, rational, utility maximizer[s]" that respond to incentives that advance their own interests.279 The stimulus that spurs a legislator to vote one way or another on any given political issue is relatively
straightforward: re-election.2"' To that end, a legislator's vote will often
align with the pocketbooks of those who elected the legislator to office. If
a legislative proposal harms the economic interests of a legislator's constituents, public choice theory predicts that the legislator will vote against
that proposal rather than face the wrath of the voters at the ballot box on
election day.
The troubling relationship between special interest groups and legislators posited by public choice theory permeates eminent domain jurisprudence. In Southwestern Illinois Development Authority v. National City
EnvironmentalLLC, the Supreme Court of Illinois ruled that a condemnation of private property and subsequent transfer to a private party for the
purpose of building a parking lot adjacent to the third party's racetrack did
not constitute a constitutional exercise of the eminent domain power.2
Although the proposed parking lot benefited the public by alleviating traffic and promoting public safety, the court was troubled by the influence
exerted by the private beneficiary during the process of developing the
plan.2" 2 The court concluded that "this action was undertaken solely in
response to Gateway's expansion goals and its failure to accomplish those
goals through purchasing the National City Environmental's land at an
acceptable negotiated price.23 It appears the Soutwestern Illinois Development Authority's true intentions were to act as a default broker of land
for Gateway's proposed parking plan."2 " Similarly, Justice O'Connor's
biting dissent in Kelo pointed out that "[tihe beneficiaries are likely to be
those citizens with disproportionate influence and power in the political
process, including large corporations and development firms." 5 In other
words, private parties captured the legislative process and engineered results that generated self-serving benefits.
The post-Kelo effort to reform eminent domain in California provides
a context within which to examine the influence of special interest groups

ra Sinclair, Purposive Behavior in the U.S. Congress:A Review Essay, 8 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 117, 126
(1983)).
279.
See Farber & Frickey, supra note 277, at 878 (quoting D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 1
(1979)).
280.
Id. at 891 n.115.
281.
768 N.E.2d 1, 11 (111.
2002).
282.
Id. at 9.
283.
Id. at 10.
284.
Id.
285.
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 505 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also,
e.g., Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 468 (Mich. 1981) (commenting that "[b]ehind the frenzy of official activity was the unmistakable guiding and sustaining,
indeed controlling, hand of the General Motors Corporation").
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on legislative behavior from a public choice perspective. Like elsewhere in
the nation, state politicians in California placed ideology aside and united
in the fight for eminent domain reform.286 In the absence of party politics,
at least on the surface, state politicians introduced a number of legislative
measures in an effort to prohibit private parties from accruing benefits
associated with projects involving eminent domain. 21 However, not everyone in California joined in the reform effort-the California Redevelopment Association and other local governments took steps to block the passage of reform legislation, or at least water down whatever legislation
passed. 2' Responding to such pressure, some of the politicians "ginned up
a strategy to cool off the anti-eminent domain fervor" and replaced aggressive proposals with one that placed a two-year moratorium on the seizures of private residences and called for a state-wide study of the problem. 289 As a result, politicians could claim that they were dealing with the
issue of takings for economic development "without doing any real damage to redevelopment agencies." 21 In the end, the only eminent domain
measure to be placed in front of Governor Schwarzenegger was one that
permitted the Rumsey Band of Wintun Indians to assist in the management
291
of a 17,300-acre ranch to be acquired by eminent domain, if necessary.
Though it is but one example, the deceleration of the momentum toward strong eminent domain reform in California vividly illustrates the
tenets of public choice theory. State politicians reacted to the fear inspired
by Kelo and made statements that, in all likelihood, fed that fear. For example, one California politician interjected that Kelo "opened a new era
when the rich and powerful can use government to seize property of ordinary citizens for private gain. , 29 2 The effect of such polemics is multifaceted-they tap into anti-Kelo public sentiment, generate positive publicity, and stoke the fire for reform. Positive publicity aids in the pursuit
of re-election and the eventual passage of legislation aimed at the subject
of the polemical comments makes the speaker appear to be influential,
which has the potential to sway voters at election time. On the other hand,
public commentary is bound to incite opposition, which is exactly what
happened in California. The California Redevelopment Association and
other local bodies mobilized and campaigned against reform.293 Fearing a
deleterious effect on their prospects for re-election, some politicians pro-

286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

See Waiters, supra note 23, at A3.
Id. The measures took the form of bills and constitutional amendments. Id.
Id.
Id. (identifying "Democratic leaders" as those responsible for the alternative measure).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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posed less stringent reforms.294 The effect of the competing proposals was
to divide the support between them such that neither had sufficient support
to get to the governor's desk.295 In short, public choice's tug of war for
advantageous legislation produced no clear winner as special interest
groups competed with one another and split political support to the point
that resulted in a virtual legislative stalemate.
Without a clear winner in the marketplace of legislation, public choice
theory predicts that eminent domain reform legislation should straddle a
fence in the middle of the road, at least if viewed from the perspective of
the parties interested in the outcome. Although they may differ in degree,
each post-Kelo legislative reform curtails the exercise of eminent domain
in one way or another, which responds to the pressure for change exerted
by proponents of reform. On the other hand, each reform also contains a
sufficient amount of wiggle room in the form of blight removal, which
offers an olive branch to opponents of eminent domain reform. Neither
side emerged with a complete victory from the competition for favorable
legislation, but neither side lost much, if anything, either.
In the alternative, of course, a pitched battle between special interest
groups that results in legislative gridlock might result in the passage of no
legislation. However, public choice theory posits that legislators have reelection as their primary interest; therefore, the media coverage and the
resulting public furor over the result in Kelo foreclosed the option to do
nothing.296 Conversely, authoring or supporting legislation that clamped
down on eminent domain with too much force threatened to alienate powerful political insiders.297 The result is, again, legislation that straddles a
fence in the middle of the road. Indeed, a legislator may have, in fact,
increased the probability for re-election by supporting such legislation
because it is sufficiently ambiguous for each side to claim victory, or at
least disclaim defeat. The public, and most importantly, voters, are mollified by the passage of legislation that offers increased protection for private property. Furthermore, neither proponents nor opponents of eminent
domain reform see their oxen gored. Enacting limited reforms serves the
best interests of public choice's legislator and represents a compromise
between all of the parties involved in the legislative process.

294.
295.
296.
297.

See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
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V. A SECOND LOOK AT POST-KELO REFORMS

Aiming substantive and legislative process criticisms at the microlevel-characterizing reforms as "toothless" products 298 of "state legislators [who] don't really believe in property rights" 299-overlooks the profound effect of post-Kelo activity on the macro-level. 300 Assuming that the
"despotic power" plodded along in relative anonymity before Kelo, the
media attention showered upon Kelo served an educative function by rocketing eminent domain to forefront of public consciousness. In turn, state
legislatures across the nation took action in response to the public furor
over the decision. 30 ' As further evidence of the public's post-Kelo engagement with the issue of eminent domain, voters in ten states approved
ballot measures that restricted eminent domain during the November 2006
election.30 2 In all likelihood, none of this eminent domain legislation would
have been produced in the absence of Kelo. Eminent domain's "summer of
scrutiny"303 amounted to a "Great Property Rights Revival."'0°
On the micro-level, critics complain that most of the post-Kelo measures are not sufficiently stout to offer meaningful protection for private
property owners-permitting eminent domain to be used to eradicate blight
paves the way for abuse. However, asserting that the vagueness of the
blight standard permits abuse does not mean that condemning authorities
will, in fact, abuse the standard. For example, the first post-Kelo decision
to rule on a public use challenge under state constitutional law was issued
by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Board of County Commissioners of
Muskogee County v. Lowery.3 °5 In Lowery, a county sought to acquire

easements to construct three water pipelines by condemning the nonblighted properties of three landowners.3 °6 One of the pipelines was supposed to serve local residents while the other two pipelines were intended
to benefit a privately owned electrical plant.30 7 The county initiated emillya Somin, Blight Sweet Blight, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 14, 2006, at 42, 42-43.
298.
299.
Pristin, supra note 257, at C6.
300.
See Somin, supra note 298, at 42-43.
301.
See id.
302.
National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 237.
Egan, supra note 1, at Al.
303.
304.
Monica Davey, South Dakotans Reject Sweeping Abortion Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2006, at
P8 (suggesting that the affirmative vote on ballot measures designed to respond to Kelo "were seen as
a resounding indication of voters' anger at a 2005 United States Supreme Court decision that said such
takings were legal"); Timothy Sandefur, The Great Property Rights Revival, NATIONAL REVIEW
ONLINE, Nov. 27, 2006, http://article.nationalreview.coml?q=NWFmZTVmZWwODJmYjcwY2YI
YzkzYmY3YjE4YTEyNTg= (further stating that "[w]hen [the government] undertakes development
by seizing people's property and giving it to others, it commits exactly the kind of injustice our Founding Fathers rebelled against two centuries ago. On Tuesday, Americans rebelled against it again").
136 P.3d 639 (Okla. 2006).
305.
Id. at 642, 647 nI.11.
306.
Id. at 642-43.
307.
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nent domain proceedings and justified the takings on the ground of economic development alone. 30 8 The landowners then brought suit claiming
that the takings violated the public use clause of Oklahoma's constitution. 3°1 In its decision, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma observed that unlike the broad statutory authority to exercise eminent domain in Kelo, Oklahoma law required a finding of blight to justify the deployment of eminent domain for purposes of economic development. 3 0 The county did not
make a finding of blight prior to condemnation, which, presumably, made
the decision rather easy. The court held that "economic development alone
does not constitute a public purpose" for purposes of Oklahoma's state
constitution.1

Shortly after the Supreme Court of Oklahoma made its decision in
Lowery, the Supreme Court of Ohio issued an opinion in a public use case
with facts surprisingly similar to Kelo: Norwood v. Homey. 312 To combat
an ever-growing financial deficit, the city of Norwood, Ohio, decided to

acquire several parcels of real property by eminent domain and transfer
them to a private developer for the construction of office and retail
space. 1 Although Norwood's city code permitted condemnation for the
eradication of blight, Norwood's surveyors testified at trial that the neighborhood to be acquired "was not a slum, blighted, or a deteriorated area"
but, at most, a "deteriorating area. 314 As a result, Norwood classified the

property subject to condemnation as a "deteriorating area," a classification
that justified the exercise of eminent domain under the city's code, and
initiated eminent domain proceedings.3 5 Because their properties were to
308.
Id. at 643-45.
309.
Id. The authority to condemn was granted by OKLA. STAT. tit. 27, § 5 (1997 & Supp. 2008).
Article 2, § 23 of the Oklahoma Constitution declares that "[p]rivate property shall not be taken or
damaged for public use without just compensation."
310.
Id. at 650 (stating that "[clontrary to the Connecticut statute applicable in Kelo, which expressly authorized eminent domain for the purpose of economic development, we note the absence of
such express Oklahoma statutory authority for the exercise of eminent domain in furtherance of economic development in the absence of blight" and reasoning that the usage of eminent domain to eliminate blight not only satisfied the public use requirement of the state constitution, but also justified the
post-condemnation of land to a private party).
311.
Id.
312.
853 N.E.2d 1115, 1122 (Ohio 2006). At the time of the case, the city had a $3.6 million
deficit on its books and reduced bus and recreational services as cost-savings measures. See Merit
Brief of Appellee Rookwood Partners at 6, Norwood, 853 N.E.2d 1115 (Nos. 2005-1210, 2005-1211),
2005 WL 3630498. The developer planned to construct over 200 residences and more than 500,000
square feet of office and retail space in Norwood, which was estimated to add $2 million per year to
city coffers. Norwood, 853 N.E.2d at 1124.
313.
Norwood, 853 N.E.2d at 1124.
314.
Id.at 1126.
315.
Id. at 1125. Norwood Code 163.02(c) defined a "deteriorating area" as "an area, whether
predominantly built up or open, which is not a slum, blighted or deteriorated area but which, because
of incompatible land uses, nonconforming uses, lack of adequate parking facilities, faulty street arrangement, obsolete platting, inadequate community and public utilities, diversity of ownership, tax
delinquency, increased density of population without commensurate increases in new residential buildings and community facilities, high turnover in residential or commercial occupancy, lack of mainten-
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be conveyed to a private party post-condemnation, five property owners
challenged Norwood's exercise of eminent domain in an attempt to retain
their homes.31 6 After winding through the state courts, the Supreme Court
of Ohio had to decide whether or not Norwood's eminent domain action
satisfied the public use requirement of Article I, § 19 of the Ohio Constitution.317 Although not as straightforward as Lowery, the Supreme Court of
Ohio held that economic benefits alone did not meet the public use requirement of Ohio's constitution. 8
However, the court took an additional bite out of the ability of Ohio's
cities to acquire property by eminent domain by ruling that the "deteriorating area" standard was void for vagueness. 1 9 Variables associated with the
standard such as increased traffic, the number of dead end streets, diversity of ownership, and small front yards applied to "virtually every urban
American neighborhood, "32 which "invite[d] ad hoc and selective enforcement.'321 To support its assertion, the court claimed that the factors
used to justify Norwood's action could be found in "Beacon Hill in Boston, Greenwich Village and Tribeca in lower Manhattan, and Nob Hill in
San Francisco. "322 With a literary nod in the direction of Edith Wharton,
the court commented that a contrary ruling diminished a "cherished and
nance and repair of buildings, or any combination thereof, is detrimental to the public health, safety,
morals and general welfare, and which will deteriorate, or is in danger of deteriorating, into a blighted
area." Id. at 1125 n.5.
In contrast, Norwood Code 163.02(b) defined a "[silum, blighted or deteriorated area" as "an
area in which there are a majority of structures or other improvements, which, by reason of dilapidation, deterioration, age or obsolescence, inadequate provision for ventilation, light, air, sanitation, or
open spaces, high density of population and overcrowding, unsafe and unsanitary conditions or the
existence of conditions which endanger life or property by fire or other hazards and causes, or any
combination of such factors, and an area with overcrowding or improper location of structures on the
land, excessive dwelling unit density, detrimental land uses or conditions, unsafe, congested, poorly
designated streets or inadequate public facilities or utilities, all of which substantially impairs the
sound growth and planning of the community, is conducive to ill health, transmission of disease, infant
mortality, juvenile delinquency and crime, and is detrimental to the public health, safety, morals and
general welfare." Id.
316.
Norwood v. Homey, 830 N.E.2d 381, 383 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005), rev'd, 853 N.E.2d 1115.
317.
See Norwood, 853 N.E.2d at 1123. The private property owners lost in both trial and appellate courts and asserted several grounds of error on appeal. See id.
318.
See id. at 1142. According to the court, decisions upholding the exercise of eminent domain
under these circumstances resulted from "an artificial judicial deference" to the legislature's determination of what constituted a valid public use for eminent domain purposes. Id. at 1136. Contrary to the
deference offered to the city in the lower courts, the Supreme Court of Ohio declared that "we have
never found economic benefits alone to be a sufficient public use for a valid taking." Id. at 1141. The
court observed that economic considerations could factor into condemnation decisions, but eminent
domain was not "simply a vehicle for cash-strapped municipalities to finance community improvements." Id. A "genuine public use" had to justify the government's power to acquire land by eminent
domain. Id. Economic development alone did not constitute such a "genuine public use;" therefore,
Norwood's plan violated the public use restriction imposed by the Ohio Constitution. Id.
319.
Id. at 1142-53.
320.
Id. at 1144.
321.
Id. at 1145.
322.
Id. at 1144 n.13.
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venerable individual right based on nothing more than 'a plank of hypothesis flung across an abyss of uncertainty. '"323 Because of its twin killing of

the power of eminent domain under Ohio law, property
rights advocates
324
,"
homeowners.'
for
run
"'home
a
as
hailed Norwood
The facts of cases like Lowery and Norwood put the concern about the
potential for abuse of the blight standard in a different light. In both cases,

the blight standard was available, but the condemning authorities pegged
their justifications on other grounds. If an excessive risk of abuse of the
blight standard existed across the board, one would have expected that the
condemning authorities would have based their actions on that standard.
After all, justifying the exercise of eminent domain on the broadest, and

most accepted, ground available reduces the risk of losing a public use
challenge. However, the condemnor in Lowery did not even bother to cite

blight as a reason for its condemnation, which is unusual given that, presumably, the condemnors knew that Oklahoma law required a finding of
blight to support an eminent domain action. 3' And, Norwood's surveyors
did not categorize the area to be acquired as "blighted;" therefore, Norwood lacked the evidence to utilize the blight standard in its city code.326
These two cases, of course, cannot be understood to mean that the blight
standard is not subject to abuse at all, but the cases suggest that the blight
standard may not be subject to widespread abuse either.
Although the facts of Lowery and Norwood imply that the risk of
widespread abuse is less than feared, those cases do not unambiguously
address the threat of facially innocuous invocations of the blight standard
323.
Id. at 1146 (quoting Edith Wharton, The Descent of Man, 35 SCRIBNER'S MAG. 313, 321
(Mar. 1904), reprintedin THE SELECTED SHORT STORIES OF EDITH WHARTON 49, 62 (R.W.B. Lewis
ed., 1991)).
324.
Gregory Korte, Norwood Loses Case on Property Seizures, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, July 27,
2006, at Al (quoting the Ohio Farm Bureau Federation). For further positive commentary, see Steve
Kemme, Norwood Site to Stay Vacant For Now, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, July 29, 2006, at Al, reporting that one of the attorneys in the case described the decision as "a complete vindication of the rights
of every home and business owner in the state." More recently, two other state supreme courts issued
decisions that limited municipal authority to exercise the power of eminent domain based upon blight
designations. In Gallenthin Realty Development, Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 924 A.2d 447 (N.J.
2007), the borough sought to justify its acquisition of land by eminent domain on the ground that the
property "in need of redevelopment" because it was "not fully productive." Id. at 449. The owners of
the real property challenged the condemnation action on the ground that the borough's justification
failed to satisfy the requirements imposed by the state's constitution. Id. at 453-54. The Supreme
Court of New Jersey observed that the state constitution expressly required a finding of blight in conjunction with an exercise of eminent domain for redevelopment and held that the borough's justification fell outside of the definition of "blight" comprehended by the constitution. Id. at 455, 460. Similarly, the Supreme Court of Missouri rejected a city's exercise of eminent domain because of a lack of
evidence that the property was a "social liability" in Centene Plaza Redevelopment Corp. v. Mint
Properties,225 S.W.3d 431, 435 (Mo. 2007).
325.
See supra text accompanying note 308.
See supra text accompanying note 315. Among the surveyors testifying at trial, apparently
326.
only one concluded that the property to be acquired met the definition of blighted in the Norwood City
Code. See Norwood v. Homey, 830 N.E.2d 381, 388-90 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005), rev'd, 853 N.E.2d
1115 (Ohio 2006).
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to mask invidious discrimination. Notably, one important study that purports to document over 10,000 instances of eminent domain abuse from
1998-2004 does not allege that eminent domain decisions are widely infected with discriminatory motives.327 To the contrary, the report, which
was prepared by one of Susette Kelo's attorneys at the Institute for Justice,

asserts that "[e]minent domain these days is more ecumenical" as compared to its past.32 Overlooking eminent domain's present ecumenism,
some identify Michigan's Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit and its egregious effects on an ethnic community as an example of the
risk to some communities posed by eminent domain. 329 But, Poletown did
not involve an allegation of invidious discrimination of the type that sullies
eminent domain's history and, moreover, the Supreme Court of Michigan
eventually reversed its now infamous Poletown holding in the muchheralded County of Wayne v. Hathcock.330 Even the recent cases put under
327.

See DANA

BERLINER,

PUBLIC POWER,

PRIVATE GAIN: A FIVE-YEAR STATE-BY-STATE

REPORT EXAMINING THE ABUSE OF EMINENT DOMAIN
102 (2003), available at
http://www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/report/ED-report.pdf.
328.
Id. One would think that if invidious discrimination infected the decision-making process in a
widespread manner, this study would have featured such information because the Institute for Justice is
at the forefront of the push for eminent domain reform.
329.
304 N.W.2d 455, 459 (Mich. 1981), overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684
N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004). In Poletown, the Detroit Economic Development Corporation sought to
acquire all of the real property within an area of Detroit known as Poletown and transfer it to General
Motors so that it could build an assembly plant on the site. Id. at 458. In the midst of an economic
downturn, the city argued that such action was necessary "to alleviate and prevent conditions of unemployment and fiscal distress." Id. The dispossessed homeowners of Poletown, who were mostly of
Polish descent, countered that the condemnation was a taking for a private use in violation of the
public use clause in the state constitution. Id. According to the Poletown complainants, the public
benefit derived from the condemnation was "incidental" to the actual motive for the taking. Id.
Ruling against the private property owners, the Michigan Supreme Court, ironically, transposed the complainants' assertions and used them to support its conclusion. Id. at 459. The court
maintained that "[t]he power of eminent domain is to be used in this instance primarily to accomplish
the essential public purposes of alleviating unemployment and revitalizing the economic base of the
community. The benefit to a private interest is merely incidental." Id. On the other hand, the court
characterized the public benefit of the city's plan to be "clear and significant." Id. As a result, the
court ruled that the "public" benefit of the City's plan-"the economic boost"-satisfied the "public
use" requirement of the state constitution. Id.
330.
684 N.W.2d 765, 787-88 (Mich. 2004). In Hathcock, Wayne County sought to exercise its
power of eminent domain to acquire nineteen parcels of real property for the purpose of building a
"business and technology park." Id. at 769. Taking the appropriate cue from the Poletown decision,
the county claimed that the plan would resuscitate the "struggling economy" in that part of the state.
Id. at 770. Dispossessed landowners, however, argued that the county's plan violated the public use
clause in the state constitution. Id. Notably, the complainants did not assert that the government's plan
failed to yield any benefit to the public. Id. Instead, the property owners urged that the benefits to
private parties were far greater than those accruing to the public in the aggregate. Id. at 771. In short,
the arguments in Hathcock were similar to those addressed in Poletown.
The Supreme Court of Michigan ruled that building a "technology park" for the primary benefit
of a private party did not satisfy the "public use" requirement of Michigan's constitution. Id. at 788.
The court reviewed its pre-Poletown eminent domain jurisprudence and found that the county's plan
lacked any of the characteristics of a public use identified in cases decided before Poletown. Id. at 78588. The county's plan did not create "instrumentalities of commerce" like roads, which require the
recipient of the property to remain accountable to the public post-condemnation, or which eliminate an
issue of public concern like blight. Id. at 786-88. For the Hathcock court, the county's plan amounted
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the microscope of the white hot media, like Kelo or Norwood, lacked facts
that might call the condemnor's motive into question.331 The risk of abuse
is undoubtedly real and can never be discounted; therefore, courts must be

ever-vigilant to protect against the exercise of eminent domain for discriminatory purposes. Nonetheless, recent cases like Kelo, Lowery, and

Norwood indicate that decision-makers are not necessarily doomed to repeat the invidious discrimination associated with eminent domain's past.332
An additional reason to suspect that widespread abuse of the blight
standard may not occur in the future also applies to the abuse of eminent

domain as a general matter-eminent domain is costly for condemning
authorities. The process of condemnation is cumbersome and expensive;
therefore, eminent domain is employed as a last resort.333 Instead, condemning authorities prefer to acquire property by private negotiation ra-

ther than by condemnation.334 However, the cost is not limited to monetary
expenditure-the political fallout from any exercise of eminent domain
could be enormous. Public choice theory predicts that elected decisionmakers will be very wary of invoking eminent domain because negative
publicity threatens to diminish the probability of re-election. 3 5 Given the
public's heightened awareness about eminent domain post-Kelo, any exercise of eminent domain is likely to be accompanied by a hyper-sensitive
evaluation of the necessity of condemnation in an effort to minimize political damage.
to nothing more than a taking of land from one private party to another private party for the primary
benefit of the latter. See id. at 786. Distancing itself from Poletown, the court stated that Poletown was
.most notable for its radical and unabashed departure from the entirety of this Court's pre-1963 eminent domain jurisprudence." Id. at 785. The court emphatically declared that "the Poletown analysis
provides no legitimate support for the condemnations proposed in this case and ... is overruled." Id.
at 787.
331.
See Korte, supra note 324, at IA (referring to Norwood as a "densely packed working-to
middle-class neighborhood"); George F. Will, Legal Theft in Norwood, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 24, 2006,
at 94, 95 (referring to Fort Trumbull as a "modest middle-class neighborhood).
332.
Interestingly, the "abuses" catalogued in Berliner's impressive compilation do not unambiguously prove that eminent domain is utilized in an invidiously discriminatory manner. To the contrary, most of the cases in the compilation display eminent domain's "ecumenical" nature. See
BERLINER, supra note 327, at 102. Similarly, a recent report issued by the Institute of Justice does not
go as far as to assert that invidious discrimination is rampant in eminent domain decision-making.
MINDY THOMPSON FULLILOVE, EMINENT DOMAIN AND AFRICAN-AMERICANS: WHAT IS THE PRICE

OF THE COMMONS? (2007), available at http://www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/publications/PerspecfivesFullilove.pdf.
333.
See, e.g., Fresh Twist on Eminent Domain, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2006, at NJI 1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/24/opinionNJdomain.html (quoting the executive director of the
New Jersey Conservation Foundation regarding the financial cost of eminent domain); Weimar, supra
note 2, at lB.
334.
See Weimar, supra note 2, at lB (quoting the development administrator of St. Petersburg,
Florida, regarding the financial expenditure associated with eminent domain).
335.
Id.; see, e.g., Fresh Twist, supra note 328; Christopher Schurz, Property Owners Nervous
Over High Court Ruling, LAS CRUCES SUN-NEWS, June 26, 2005, at Al (crediting an official as
saying that eminent domain "could easily leave a bad taste in the mouth of the public," which made
officials "wary" of using it);.
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Returning to the Connecticut city that began the debate over eminent
domain, the results of New London's November 2006 election serve as a
warning to an elected official who discounts the effect of eminent domain
on re-election. In addition to property taxes and concerns about the success of economic development, the "national controversy over seizures of
private homes in the Fort Trumbull neighborhood" was among the issues
at the forefront of the election.336 According to a newspaper report, election day:
[P]rovided the answer to the question many months old: Would
misgivings about everything from taxes to the property seizures at
Fort Trumbull to the council's occasionally chaotic power struggles with the New London Development Corp. finally lead voters
to turn the incumbent Democrats and Republicans out?
The answer, at least as it applied to all three of them, was yes.337
Of course, the results of the election in New London, like any other
election, cannot be traced to the public's approval or disapproval of a candidate's record on one single issue-New London is "not a one-issue
town. "338 Although supporting the condemnations that began the Kelo affair may not have been sufficient to lose the election in isolation, the turmoil that followed Kelo is not likely to have benefited re-election campaigns either. New London's election results send a powerful message to
decision-makers about the risks associated with any exercise of eminent
domain, particularly if it gets the label "abuse" attached to it.
Interestingly, statistical information regarding the extent of eminent
domain abuse is ambiguous at best. The most-oft cited report on the scope
of eminent domain abuse is the aforementioned Institute for Justice study
with its finding that more than 10,000 property owners had either been
subjected to condemnation proceedings or threatened with such over a
five-year period beginning in 1998. 339 If accurate, such a number would be
eye-opening. According to one assessment of the study, however, the figure is deceiving because it represents a total of only 222 projects during
the time period. 3' Furthermore, a November 2006 report prepared by the
336.
Ted Mann, In New London, A Vote For Change, THE DAY, Nov. 9, 2005, at Al (on file with
the Alabama Law Review) (including property taxes and "faltering economic development" among the
issues that attracted voter attention).
337.
Id.
338.
Id.
339.
BERLINER, supra note 327, at 9 (stating that there were "10,282+ filed or threatened condemnations for private parties" which broke down into "3,722 + properties with condemnations filed
for the benefit of private parties" and "6,560+ properties threatened with condemnations for private
parties").
340.
Errol Louis, Eminent Domain Foes Should Stop Skewing Facts, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 21,
2006, at 33 (citing information from Professors Robert Dreher and John Echeverria of Georgetown
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United States Governmental Accountability Office failed to gather statistics regarding how often eminent domain is used, for what purposes, and
who obtained benefits from condemnations because of a lack of national or
state data to illuminate the questions. 341 Given the ambiguity regarding the
breadth of abuse, the legislative response to the torrent of criticism directed at Kelo is most fairly characterized as pragmatic. State legislatures
adopted reforms that addressed the specific concerns raised in Kelo, but
went no further in the absence of information to bring additional problems
into clearer focus.342
The benefit of enacting pragmatic measures rather than heavy-handed
reforms is clearer when the costs of enacting overly aggressive measures
are taken into account. The increase in the stringency of eminent domain
controls would come at the expense of the flexibility afforded to communities to deal with problems in a manner commensurate with community
standards. In other words, heavy-handed reforms inhibit community selfdetermination. Kansas City, Kansas, for example, "had been burdened for
generations by poverty, crime, and a stagnant economy" until it used eminent domain to build a racetrack.343 Despite opposition, the project went
forward and has been "a glorious success for this once-struggling country. "31 In fact, one former opponent of the project described the impact of
the project as "amazing" and "just a beautiful thing."345 Eminent domain
also played an important role in the redevelopment of Baltimore's Inner
Harbor, which not only rejuvenated Baltimore's economic fortunes, but
also transformed the locale's flagging image from a blighted area to the
"city's front porch. , 346 Of course, not all projects will bear fruit, but at
least communities have the ability to choose their fates, or poisons, in the
absence of stringent regulations. For those states that have enacted aggresLaw School).
341.
U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, EMINENT DOMAIN: INFORMATION ABOUT ITS USES
AND EFFECT ON PROPERTY OWNERS AND COMMUNITIES IS LIMITED 3 (Nov. 2006), available at

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0728.pdf.
342.
See supra Subpart IV.A. and Subpart IV.B.
Timothy J. Dowling, Give Eminent Domain a Chance: Law Supports City's Redevelopment,
343.
L.A. DAILY J., Feb. 22, 2005, at 6, available at http://www.communityrights.org/pdfs/ladj2-2205.pdf (also identifying successful eminent domain redevelopment projects in Mississippi); see also
Dennis Cauchon, States Review Eminent Domain, USA TODAY, Feb. 20, 2006, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-02-19-eminentdomain-x-htm (observing that New York's
Times Square was "revamped" by eminent domain); Jill Gardiner, Mayor Ups the Ante on Eminent
Domain, THE N.Y. SUN, May 3, 2006, availableat http://www.nysun.com/article/32017. The article
quotes the mayor of New York City as saying "Times Square really was the poster child for a seedy,
dangerous, unattractive, porno-laced place.... Because of eminent domain and some forward-looking
people in this city, they turned it into a place where 24 hours a day you're safe on the street." d.
344.
Dowling, supra note 343.
Id.
345.
346.
Brief of Amicus Curiae Mayor and City Council of Baltimore in Support of Respondents at 1,
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108), 2005 WL 166940; see also Terry
Pristin, Developers Can't Imagine a World Without Eminent Domain, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2006, at
C5, available at http:/lwww.nytimes.com/2006/01/18/realestate/l8domain.html.
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sive reform measures, like Florida, citizens may presently applaud the
legislature's tough stance on the exercise of eminent domain in the
present.l 7 On the other hand, a possibility exists that "[o]ne day in the
near future, Floridians are going to wake up and realize they have been
duped. ,38
VI. CONCLUSION

Most Supreme Court decisions involving property law, or any other
legal subject for that matter, anonymously fade into history. Kelo is different. A comment from the Supreme Court of Georgia's 1851 decision of
Parhamv. Justices of the Inferior Court captures the underlying reason for
Kelo's anomalous grip on the public's attention.349 In Parham, the court
wrote that "[a]ll grants of land are in subordination to the eminent domain
which remains in the State; and from the necessities of the social compact,
they are subject to this condition."3" The public might understand the loss
of private property for the construction of a school, firehouse, or a public
road as part of the "social compact," but the holding in Kelo extended
beyond those public uses. For many, Kelo represented an alarming exemplar of the ability of special interests to capture governmental decisionmaking power and use it to violate the cherished right of private property.
Kelo breached Parham's "social compact"-government invaded the right
of private property for the benefit of a private party that happened to be a
big business. In that light, the flurry of post-Kelo legislative activity is a
governmental effort to repair that breach, an attempt to regain the public's
trust. Given the magnitude of the breach symbolized by the ongoing eminent domain debate, post-Kelo legislation cannot yet be equated to restitution, but rather mitigation.
Whatever one's view of the merits of the remedial effort, the sheer volume of post-Kelo legislation is a testament to the health of the federalism
that lies at the foundation of our system of government. In response to an
unpopular decision from a federal branch of government, state legislatures
enacted statutory law that addressed the specific causes of the public
squall. Post-Kelo legislation banned economic development takings, barred
post-condemnation transfers to private parties, or both. Recognizing Kelo's federalism-enforcing aspect during his confirmation hearings, thenJudge Roberts opined that "legislative bodies in the states" possess the
power to "protect them [citizens of those states] .... where the Court has
determined, as it did 5-4 in Kelo, that [it is] not going to draw that
347.
348.
349.
350.

Weimar,supra note 2, at lB.
See id.
9 Ga. 341(Ga. 1851).
Id. at 344.
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line. "351 The states' acceptance of Justice Stevens's invitation in Kelo illustrates now Chief Justice Roberts's point.

351.
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the
United States: HearingBefore the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 286 (2005).

